Narcissism is a complex construct with a long history. Its theoretical source is attributed to Freud's (1914/1957) influential essay, "On Narcissism," and it has figured prominently ever since in the literatures of psychoanalysis, object relations, self-psychology, psychopathology, and clinical psychotherapy (e.g., Mitchell, 1988; Morrison, 1986). These literatures tell a developmental story about the clinical origins of narcissistic personality (e.g., P. F. Kernberg, 1998; Masterson, 1993; Wink, 1996), although as already discussed in this volume, empirical research on the development of narcissism is largely absent. This paucity of research is somewhat surprising, given that the concept of narcissism has long been thought, at least in the popular imagination, to capture something fundamental about the developmental experience of adolescents. As Bleiberg (1994) put it, "Perhaps like no other phase of life, the passage through adolescence bears the hallmarks of narcissistic vulnerability: a proneness to embarrassment and shame, acute self-consciousness and shyness, and painful questions about self-esteem and self-worth" (p. 31). However, one looks largely in vain for the term narcissism in the subject indexes of developmental textbooks or in the proceedings of professional conferences devoted to the study of adolescence.
On the other hand, narcissism has attracted significant attention from social and personality researchers, especially in recent years. This research tends to focus on problems of assessment; on how narcissism is related to self-esteem, aggression, and other affective, relational and behavioral outcomes; and on whether there are subtypes of narcissism that are differentially related to adaptation and dysfunction (see Chapter 4, this volume).

It is important that research has also focused on whether self-esteem is differentially related to different forms or subtypes of narcissism. There are now theoretical and empirical literatures that draw two important distinctions: between healthy, “normal” narcissism and its dysfunctional type; and between overt and covert forms of narcissism. For example, the possibility of adaptive and healthy narcissism is evident in Winnicott’s (1965) object relational theory and in Kohut’s (1977) self-psychology. For Winnicott, self-absorption and a sense of subjective omnipotence provide the psychological aliments that support self-extension, ambition, creativity and growth. Kohut argued that normal self-development can follow either a “grandiose” line characterized by exhibitionism, assertiveness, and ambition (“I am perfect, and you admire me”) or else an “idealizing” line characterized by an idealization of figures and goals (“You are perfect, and I am part of you”). Both theorists suggested that narcissistic “illusions” can be used to creatively sustain psychological growth and self-development (Mitchell, 1988). Therefore, a narcissistic stance may be particularly adaptive for meeting the developmental challenges of late adolescence and emerging adulthood (Wink, 1992).

Of course, narcissism can be maladaptive as well, taking the form of self-pathology and personality disorder. O. Kernberg (1975) argued that the grandiose self oscillates between cycles of self-admiration and devaluation of others to protect against dependency and disappointment, often leading more toward dysfunction and pathology than toward healthy adaptation. Moreover, dysfunctional narcissism can take overt and covert forms that reflect either two facets of the same individual (Rohde et al., 1995) or else two expressive “types” of narcissism (Wink, 1996). Hence, alongside overt displays of haughty grandiosity, invulnerability, and entitlement there could reside covert and hypersensitive feelings of anxiety, inferiority, and worthlessness.

Although not everyone agrees that narcissism can be overt or even healthy (e.g., Twenge & Campbell, 2003), there is evidence of different types of narcissism and their differential relationship with adaptation and dysfunction (e.g., Davis, Claridge, & Brewer, 1996; Wink, 1992; Zeigler-Hill, Clark, & Pickard, 2008). For example, normal narcissism appears to counterindicate daily and dispositional sadness, depression, neuroticism and anxiety and to be positively associated with subjective well-being (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). Moreover, a number of narcissism typologies have been proposed that trade on the distinction between normal and dysfunctional narcissism and between overt and covert narcissism (Wink, 1991, 1996). In one study, Lapsley and Aasela (2006) identified a typology of overt, covert, and adaptive narcissism in a cluster analysis of extant assessments. In a sample of late adolescents, Lapsley and Aasela found that overt and covert narcissism were both associated with indices of dysfunctional adjustment, including pathology of separation-individuation (with covert narcissism associated with a somewhat poorer profile of adjustment), whereas a moderate degree of narcissism was associated with positive adaptation.

Finally, there is much research interest in charting the behavioral and interpersonal concomitants of narcissism. There is evidence, for example, that narcissists are prone to rage reactions, violence, and aggression, particularly if they are frustrated, insulted, or socially rejected (e.g., Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Twenge & Campbell, 2003). Moreover, narcissism is detected readily on social networking websites (Buffardi & Campbell, 2008) and may be more prevalent among college students in the present generation than in the past (Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008a, 2008b), although this position is disputed (Treziesiewski, Donnellan, & Robins, 2008a, 2008b).

However, this expanding literature on narcissism is notably lacking a significant contribution from developmental science. There are perhaps a number of reasons for this. One is that it is hard to translate narcissism into the language of normative adolescent development in a way that does not presume pathology or personality disorder. Although there are good grounds for asserting a form of narcissism that is adaptive (or perhaps compensatory) for managing the vicissitudes of the adolescent experience, the work of translation for developmental purposes still needs to be done. Similarly, the very notion that ego development unfolds along the lines of separation-individuation is not a perspective that commands widespread notice in contemporary adolescent psychology, even though separation-individuation is (in our view) the most fundamental developmental challenge facing adolescents and young adults.

Even if one acknowledges that separation-individuation is a crucial developmental challenge, and that narcissistic reactions are one of its characteristic (and possibly adaptive) features, there is still an assessment problem in that most tools are downward extensions of measures from the adult literature to focus on pathological narcissism (see Chapter 4, this volume). Nevertheless, we hold out the possibility that adolescent narcissism, as a normative developmental construct and one that is immanent to the process of separation-individuation, may be different in kind from the narcissism in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994).

In this chapter, we present a developmental approach toward investigating narcissism in adolescence. We argue that traditional accounts of separation-individuation carve out a role for narcissism that is translated best in terms of
personal fable constructs that are well-known to adolescent psychology. Put differently, we argue that the personal fables of subjective omnipotence and personal uniqueness are instantiations of normal adolescent narcissism. Indeed, these ideational tendencies are concomitants of the separation-individuation process, whose function is to manage normative challenges to self-esteem. We next take up the problem of assessment by describing theoretically derived measures of adolescent narcissism and show that normative adolescent narcissism takes different forms with different implications for adjustment.

NARCISSISM AND SEPARATION-INDIVIDUATION

The psychodynamic tradition has suggested that the various features of narcissism are mobilized as part of a defensive, compensatory stance, perhaps to help the adolescent cope with the vulnerabilities that coincide with separation-individuation and other aspects of ego development (Bros, 1962; Josselson, 1988). Separation-individuation requires adolescents to shed parental dependencies, exercise autonomous agency, and become an individuated self, but in the context of ongoing relational commitments. Narcissistic reactions emerge as a concomitant of this process to ward off the mourning reactions that attend the loss of childhood identifications and to fortify the adolescent against the vulnerabilities that attend this developmental transition. A surge of narcissism helps the adolescent maintain self-esteem until it can be established on a footing independent of the childhood identifications that are being updated and reconstructed over the course of the individuation process.

It is important to note how this tradition understands the role of narcissism in the separation-individuation process. Sarnoff (1987) argued, for example, that this compensatory and "reactive narcissism" involves a sense of omnipotence that includes "grandiose ideas, plans and views of the self" (p. 26). In Sarnoff's view, narcissistic omnipotence "denotes a defensive and reactive heightening of self-esteem to cope with inner feelings of low self-worth, depressive mood and empty feelings" (p. 25). Similarly, Bros (1962, p. 98) suggested that the upsurge of narcissism is a "restitution strategy" whereby the adolescent's newly keen perception of inner life and his or her "willful creation of ego states of a poignant internal perception of the self" lead to a heightened sense of uniqueness, indestructibility, and personal agency. Bros also believed, however, that such "narcissistic" ideation tended to impair the adolescent's judgment and therefore was problematic, its defensive qualities notwithstanding.

We make two observations about this psychodynamic account of separation-individuation and narcissism. First, adolescent narcissism, as a natural outgrowth of the individuation process, takes certain recognizable forms. It takes the form of subjective omnipotence, of a heightened sense of uniqueness, and of "indestructibility" (which we understand as adolescent invulnerability; see Lapsley, 2003). As "reactive narcissism" (Sarnoff) or as a "narcissistic restitution strategy" (Bros), omnipotence, uniqueness, and invulnerability are forms of narcissism that have not yet been captured adequately by assessment strategies.

Personal Fables

Yet there is an allied developmental literature in which the notions of omnipotence, uniqueness, and invulnerability are quite prominent, although they are not understood in terms of adolescent narcissism or in the context of separation-individuation. The theory of adolescent egocentrism, for example, is one of the venerable theories of adolescent development, a staple of every textbook. Although the notion of adolescent egocentrism has its critics (e.g., Lapsley, 1993; Lapsley & Murphy, 1985), it does yield a number of constructs that provide strong integrative possibilities for a theory of adolescent narcissism.

According to Elkind (1967), adolescents are prone to a form of cognitive egocentrism when they make the transition into formal operations. During this transition, adolescents tend to overassimilate their experience, making them vulnerable to cognitive differentiation errors that result in a number of distinctive patterns of ideation. One pattern is the tendency to construct personal fables. Personal fables typically include themes of invulnerability (an incapability of being harmed or injured), omnipotence (viewing the self as a source of special authority, influence, or power), and personal uniqueness ("no one understands me"). These are, of course, the very terms of reference noted in psychodynamic accounts of the transitory narcissism of separation-individuation. From Elkind's view, the personal fable describes the adolescent's conviction of personal uniqueness such that subjective experience cannot be understood adequately by others or meaningfully shared and that the omnipotence of one's reflections should be sufficient to compel others to submit to one's idealtistic schemes. Hence, according to Elkind:

Perhaps because he believes he is of importance to so many people... he comes to regard himself, and particularly his feelings, as something special and unique. Only he can suffer with such agonized intensity or experience such exquisite rapture. The emotional torment... exemplify the adolescent's belief in the uniqueness of his own emotional experience. (p. 1031)

Bros (1962) used almost identical language to describe the transitory narcissism of separation-individuation. He wrote that "It is as if the adolescent experiences the world with a unique sensory quality that is not shared
by others: ‘Nobody ever felt the way I do,’ ‘Nobody sees the world the way I do.’” (p. 93). The grandiosity of the personal fable is reflected also in the surge of personal agency, omnipotence, and sense of indestructibility that Blos described as an outcome of the “self-induced ego state of a poignant internal perception of the self” (p. 98).

Clearly, there is a close alignment of constructs across two very different theoretical traditions of adolescent development. Indeed, there is little difference between Elkind’s account of the personal fable ideation that results from cognitive egocentrism and Blos’s account of the transitory narcissism (as a restitution strategy) that emerges in separation–individuation. This convergence suggests that the importance of personal uniqueness, omnipotence, and invulnerability for understanding the developmental challenges of adolescence is vouched for not only by the psychodynamic tradition but by cognitive developmental theory as well.

The two theories agree that transitory narcissism (Blos) and personal fable ideation (Elkind) can be problematic features of adolescent development. Although transitory narcissism has a defensive and compensatory role in supporting the self-esteem of individuating adolescents, Blos (1962) worried that it might compromise their judgment in critical situations. Similarly, the tendency to construct personal fables has been linked both to reckless and delinquent behavior (Arnett, 1992; Greene, Krcmar, Walters, Rubin, & Hale, 2003) and to “negative cognitions” that predict anxiety and depression (Garber, Weiss, & Shanley, 1993).

The New Look

In a number of articles, Lapsley and his colleagues have been critical of Elkind’s (1967) theory on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Lapsley, 1993; Lapsley & Murphy, 1985; Lapsley & Rice, 1988). In their view, the personal fable constructs (subjective omnipotence, personal uniqueness, and invulnerability) are poorly grounded by treating them as instantiations of logical egocentrism and are understood better as Blosian examples of a “narcissistic restitution strategy” for coping with self-image vulnerabilities that attend separation–individuation. Moreover, as in the narcissism literature, the personal fable ideations do not have uniform implications for successful adaptation.

For example, Aalsma, Lapsley, and Flannery (2006) found that subjective omnipotence and personal uniqueness were differentially related to measures of overt narcissism, depression, and self-worth among a cross-sectional sample of 6th, 8th, 10th, and 12th graders. Omnipotence was positively related to overt narcissism (as measured by the Narcissistic Personality Inventory [NPI]) and self-worth but negatively related to depression. In contrast, personal uniqueness was unrelated to overt narcissism, negatively related to self-worth, but positively related to depressive symptoms. These findings suggest that perceptions of subjective omnipotence are substantially more beneficial for adolescents than are perceptions of personal uniqueness. The relatively strong positive correlation between personal uniqueness and internalizing symptoms is an indication that the “personal fable” constructs point in different directions with respect to adaptation and dysfunction. Indeed, the extant literature supports the notion that these have dramatically distinct influences on the adolescent (e.g., Goossens, Beyers, Emen, & van Aken, 2002; Hill, Lapsley, & Gadbois, 2009).

Hence, if the personal fable constructs are manifestations of adolescent narcissism, then perhaps they present with “two faces” as well. First, one personal fable (omnipotence) points toward adaptation and successful coping, whereas the other personal fable (personal uniqueness) points toward dysfunction. Second, one construct (omnipotence) may represent the “overt” form of narcissism, given its robust correlation with the NPI in the Aalsma et al. (2006) study, whereas the other construct (personal uniqueness) is a “covert” form.

Two Faces of Narcissism

Counter to the classical view that narcissism is linked invariably to negative psychological well-being (e.g., O. Kernberg, 1975), narcissists often report better psychological health than do nonnarcissists. Narcissism appears to counterindicate anxiety and depression (Watson & Elder, 1993; Wink, 1992). Indeed, Rose (2002) suggested that narcissism is correlated positively with self-esteem and satisfaction with life. However, these findings are often only with respect to “overt” narcissism (Wink, 1991) and thus suggest the need for a more nuanced analysis of narcissism and well-being.

As one example, Rose (2002) further assessed the relationships underlying the differences in well-being for overt and covert narcissists, a distinction that follows previous work (Wink, 1991, 1996). Overt narcissism is characterized by the traits most often associated with being narcissistic: exhibitionism, an increased sense of self-importance, and preoccupation with getting attention from others. Covert narcissism is characterized by hypersensitivity, increased anxiety, and timidity; however, these narcissists still harbor visions of grandiosity. As Wink (1996) put it, “narcissistic fantasies of power and grandeur can equally well lurk behind a bombastic and exhibitionistic facade as one of shyness, vulnerability and depletion” (p. 167).

Rose (2002) predicted that overt narcissists should demonstrate greater happiness than covert narcissists and evaluated whether these relationships were mediated by self-esteem, because although overt narcissists report higher.
self-esteem (Emmons, 1984; Raskin & Terry, 1988), covert narcissists report lower self-esteem (Solomon, 1982). As self-esteem is related to subjective well-being (Myers & Diener, 1995), overt and covert narcissism may differentially influence well-being because of their differential relationships with self-esteem. Indeed, Rose found that overt narcissism positively predicted happiness, whereas covert narcissism was negatively predictive. Furthermore, these relationships were both mediated by self-esteem.

Sedikides et al. (2004) found further support for the idea that narcissism may only be adaptive when it leads to high self-esteem. In their Study 1, overt narcissism positively predicted self-esteem, which counterindicated depressive symptoms among college students, whereas in Study 2, self-esteem was shown to mediate the influence of overt narcissism on both sadness and anxiety. Finally, in Study 3, they demonstrated that overt narcissism positively predicted well-being in dyadic relationships and that this relationship was also mediated by self-esteem. Hence, evidence has accrued across multiple studies to suggest that narcissism may be adaptive if it is tied to high self-esteem (see also Chapter 4, this volume) and that this pattern is more likely with respect to overt rather than covert narcissism.

With respect to the adolescent domain, we suggest that evaluating perceptions of omnipotence and personal uniqueness can better elucidate the complexity of adolescent narcissism. Omnipotence appears to be an adolescent manifestation of overt narcissism because a sense of omnipotence leads adolescents to perceive high self-importance. Personal uniqueness, though, may be the adolescent manifestation of covert narcissism, as it leads to an increased sense of vulnerability and social anxiety. Furthermore, the relationships between these manifestations and self-esteem also point to their conceptual resemblance to overt and covert narcissism: Omnipotence appears to lead to increased self-worth, whereas personal uniqueness does not (Aalsma et al., 2006). Thus, we suggest that omnipotence and personal uniqueness resemble two faces of adolescent narcissism and that omnipotence is more adaptive. In the next section, we outline our approach to the assessment of subjective omnipotence and personal uniqueness.

ASSESSING ADOLESCENT NARCISSISM: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Traditionally, subjective omnipotence and personal uniqueness were considered manifestations of personal fable ideation, which were thought to emerge from cognitive egocentrism. We now understand these constructs as manifestations of normal adolescent narcissism. Although at least one measure of personal fable ideation includes subscales for subjective omnipotence and personal uniqueness (Lapsley, FitzGerald, Rice, & Jackson, 1989), new measures have been developed to better capture these perceptions as separate instantiations of adolescent narcissism.

Lapsley, Earley, and Dumford (2006) reported on the first attempts to develop an adolescent narcissism scale that focuses on subjective omnipotence. Standard scale development procedures yielded a 33-item scale that coalesced into three factors, accounting for 40% of the variance. One factor was called Omnipotent Action/Control (12 items, \( \alpha = .85 \)) and was indicated by items such as “Everybody knows that I am in charge.” A second factor was called Omnipotent Leadership (13 items, \( \alpha = .83 \)) and was indicated by items such as “I would make a great leader because of my abilities.” The third factor was called Omnipotent Influence (seven items, \( \alpha = .80 \)) and included items such as “I influence how others behave.”

In a study of 228 emergent adults (M_{age} = 21.85), the omnipotence scales were positively correlated with the total scale of the NPI (M = .47) and were differentially related to indices of risk behavior (M = .20) and depressive symptoms (Leadership: \( r = -.21 \)). A second study documented the convergent validity of the omnipotence scale(s) in a younger sample of 142 male adolescents (M_{age} = 16) using the Narcissistic Personality Inventory for Children (NPI-C) scale designed by Barry et al. (2003) for use with adolescents. The omnipotence scales were correlated robustly with the NPI-C (M = .59) and with indices of superior adjustment and mastery coping. Hence, these studies demonstrated that a theoretically derived and reliable measure of adolescent narcissism (as subjective omnipotence) showed convergent validity with the NPI and NPI-C, predicted risk behavior but counterindicated internalizing affect, and was positively associated with mastery coping and adjustment.

Duggan, Lapsley, and Norman (2000) reported similar scale development with respect to the assessment of personal uniqueness. The Personal Uniqueness Scale consists of 21 items (\( \alpha = .85 \)), which coalesced into two factors. One factor was called Being Understood (13 items: \( \alpha = .85 \)) and included items such as “I sometimes wonder if anybody could ever know what I am like” and “I wish other people could understand what it’s like to be me, but they just can’t.” A second factor was called Being the Same (8 items: \( \alpha = .69 \)) and included items such as “I am very different from my friends.” Duggan et al. (2000) showed that personal uniqueness was positively correlated with depressive symptoms (\( r = .44 \)). A second study (Duggan, 2001) of 248 seventh and eighth graders showed that the total personal uniqueness score was positively correlated with depressive symptoms (\( r = -.52 \)), suicidal ideation (\( r = -.37 \)), risk behavior (\( r = -.22 \)), and lifetime drug use (\( r = -.18 \)) and was negatively correlated with mastery coping (\( r = -.26 \)), superior adjustment (\( r = -.29 \)), and even academic grades (\( r = -.14 \)).

These results for omnipotence and personal uniqueness replicate those reported by Aalsma et al. (2006) in their work with the New Personal Fables
Scale. We now report on preliminary data from an ongoing study (N = 99, 52% female, M_age = 19.6 years) extending this work. First, we assessed whether the distinction between omnipotence and personal uniqueness manifested itself similarly to the overt–covert distinction among adults. Second, we tested the prediction that those high in omnipotence should demonstrate a more positive psychological profile than those high in personal uniqueness, particularly with respect to self-esteem issues.

To test our first prediction, in addition to the Omnipotence and Personal Uniqueness scales, we administered the NPI as our measure of overt narcissism. Previous research has suggested that the Authority and Self-Sufficiency subscales demonstrate an adaptive form of overt narcissism among adolescents (Barry et al., 2003; Barry, Frick, Adler, & Grafeman, 2007). Therefore, we focused on these as measures of the adaptive nature of omnipotence. We also included Hendin and Cheek’s (1997) measure of hypersensitive narcissism. Hypersensitive narcissism is a covert subtype indicated by an increased sensitivity to the opinions of others, a sense that one is fundamentally different in thought and emotion from others, and decreased self-esteem. This description is clearly linked to our conception of personal uniqueness as a subtype of narcissism among adolescents. Therefore, a positive relationship between hypersensitive narcissism and our Personal Uniqueness Scale would suggest construct validity for conceptualizing personal uniqueness as a subtype of adolescent narcissism.

To test our second prediction, we administered measures of psychological symptoms (Brief Symptom Inventory; Derogatis, 1993) and adjustment (College Adjustment Scales; Anton & Reed, 1991). Participants high in omnipotence should demonstrate a much more adaptive psychological profile compared with those high in personal uniqueness. Omnipotence should be linked to better adjustment and decreased pathological symptoms. Personal uniqueness, however, should be linked to poorer adjustment and increased symptoms. We would predict that these differences should be particularly true with respect to self-esteem issues.

First, we assessed the relationships between the NPI subscales and our two measures of adolescent narcissism. Following predictions, the Omnipotence Scale was positively correlated with the Authority, r(96) = .55, p < .001, and Self-Sufficiency, r(96) = .51, p < .001, subscales of the NPI. However, the Personal Uniqueness Scale was negatively correlated with the Authority, r(96) = −.24, p < .05, and Self-Sufficiency, r(96) = −.22, p < .05, subscales. Thus, omnipotence appears to be overt and a more adaptive form of narcissism than personal uniqueness.

Second, we assessed the relationships between our two measures of narcissism and hypersensitive narcissism. Omnipotence was unrelated to this measure, r(97) = −.03, p > .10, which follows past work suggesting only negligible relationships between overt and covert measures of narcissism (Wink, 1991). However, personal uniqueness was positively correlated with hypersensitive narcissism, r(97) = .48, p < .001. This finding supports our view that personal uniqueness is a covert subtype of narcissism. Furthermore, we suggest that it provides strong support that our scales measure distinguishable subtypes of narcissism. Indeed, omnipotence and personal uniqueness were unrelated in our sample. Further support of their distinctive character comes from their different psychological profiles.

Participants were also asked to complete the College Adjustment Scales (Anton & Reed, 1991) and the Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis, 1993) as measures of psychological well-being and adjustment. When examining the correlations between these measures and our two measures of adolescent narcissism, clearly distinct psychological profiles were demonstrated. First, as illustrated in Table 5.1, omnipotence was negatively related to depressive symptoms, self-esteem problems, and interpersonal sensitivity. In line with Hill et al. (2009), these results suggest that omnipotence may counteract psychological symptomatology among adolescents. Second, personal uniqueness demonstrated a clearly maladaptive psychological profile. Higher personal uniqueness scores were related to more academic, interpersonal, self-esteem, and family problems. In addition, personal uniqueness was linked to greater anxiety, suicidal ideation, somatization, obsessive–compulsive symptoms, depressive symptoms, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism. Clearly then, personal uniqueness appears to tap the maladaptive element of adolescent narcissism. In addition, these results appear to support our predictions that perceptions of omnipotence counterindicate self-esteem.

TABLE 5.1
Correlations Between Omnipotence and Personal Uniqueness and Measures of Pathology and Adjustment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Omnipotence</th>
<th>Personal uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somatization</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsession–compulsion</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>.39**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal sensitivity</td>
<td>−.29**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depressive symptoms</td>
<td>−.23*</td>
<td>.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>−.07</td>
<td>.42**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostility</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phobic anxiety</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.43**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paranoid ideation</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychoticism</td>
<td>−.16</td>
<td>.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic problems</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem problems</td>
<td>−.36**</td>
<td>.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family problems</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.40**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p < .01.
problems, whereas perceptions of personal uniqueness are related to increased self-esteem problems. Thus, following work with adults (Rose, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2004), narcissism appears to be psychologically adaptive only when associated with increased healthy self-esteem.

CONCLUSION

In adulthood, narcissism manifests itself as a multifaceted construct. On the one hand, narcissism can be maladaptive when it takes a more covert form, highlighted by a hypersensitivity to others and increased anxiety in social situations. On the other hand, narcissism can be adaptive when it takes a more overt form, boosting one's self-esteem and leading to a greater propensity to take part in social activities. In this chapter, we suggest that this distinction is as relevant, or perhaps more so, among adolescents as it is for adults. Indeed, following Blos (1962), it appears as though narcissism naturally manifests in adolescence in both an adaptive and overt form (i.e., omnipotence and a maladaptive and covert form (i.e., personal uniqueness). Adolescents who increase their feelings of self-worth through perceived omnipotence demonstrate a more adaptive psychological profile than those who perceive a sense of personal uniqueness. These two perceptions can thus be theoretically and empirically linked to overt and covert narcissism among adults (Wink, 1991, 1996). It may be even more informative to assess narcissism as a multifaceted construct when evaluating adolescents, because adolescents' perceived self-worth may dramatically influence the ability to navigate the difficult processes involved in self and identity formation (Blos, 1962; Kohut, 1977; Winnicott, 1965).

The thrust of our discussion centers on our claim that adolescent narcissism may demonstrate either adaptive or maladaptive characteristics, depending on its influence on the adolescent's self-esteem. In preliminary results, we find support for our claims along these lines: Omnipotence was negatively related to self-esteem problems, whereas personal uniqueness was positively related, which coincides with Aalsma et al.'s (2006) findings. However, it is as yet uncertain whether the relationships between these manifestations and well-being are mediated by self-esteem, as found among adult samples (Rose, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2004). This issue provides a necessary avenue for future research to connect our results with those found among adults. In addition, we suggest three further avenues with respect to areas other than self-esteem.

Although omnipotence appears largely positive and personal uniqueness largely negative, it will be of interest to assess the maladaptive nature of omnipotence, as well as the adaptive nature of personal uniqueness. For example, a sense of omnipotence may lead to increased risk taking. Believing in one's superiority may lead one to view actions as less risky for oneself relative to others. Several studies on personal fable ideation have found positive correlations between omnipotence and a sense of personal invulnerability (e.g., Goossens et al., 2002; Lapsley et al., 1989; Vartanian, 1997). Therefore, future work should better assess the unique role of omnipotence on risk taking.

In addition, it is possible that a sense of personal uniqueness may not be wholly maladaptive. Blos (1962) has suggested previously that adolescence is a period marked by increased creativity and originality (see also Winnicott, 1965), which may occur because adolescents believe that their thoughts are unique and original. Correspondingly, one indicator of creativity appears to be one's uniqueness in thought (e.g., Hammaker, Shafo, & Trabasso, 1975), and Dollinger (2003) suggested that one's need for uniqueness is predictive of creative activity. Thus, it seems plausible that perceived personal uniqueness may lead one to creative production. Future research should thus assess whether a sense of personal uniqueness may lead to adaptive benefits, such as increased creativity.

It would also be of interest to chart these constructs longitudinally to assess whether their adaptive and maladaptive elements have consistent effects across adolescence. Aalsma et al. (2006) provided some initial results along this line. In their cross-sectional study of 6th, 8th, 10th, and 12th graders, they tested whether the relationships between personal fable ideation and adjustment measures differed systematically with time. The relationship of personal uniqueness with externalizing behavior demonstrated a quadratic function. Specifically, it appears most closely related to internalizing problems during middle adolescence, but the relationship begins to attenuate by 12th grade. Thus, personal uniqueness may be most maladaptive during middle adolescence. With respect to omnipotence, though, its profile remained largely consistent and positive across the four assessments. Future research should continue along this line to provide a fuller picture of the two faces of narcissism across adolescent development.

Despite the popularity of narcissism in the mainstream and in research, developmental accounts of narcissism are surprisingly absent, particularly with respect to adolescence. In this chapter, we promote a view of adolescent narcissism that aligns with past theories of separation-individuation and personal fable ideation. From these theories, we suggest that narcissism manifests itself in adolescence as perceived omnipotence and personal uniqueness. Omnipotence is an adaptive and overt form that leads to an increased sense of self-worth that buffers adolescents against internalizing symptoms. Personal uniqueness is a maladaptive, covert form that is associated with social anxiety and timidity, which in turn makes the adolescent more susceptible to
internalizing symptoms. Indeed, we suggest that assessing these constructs, rather than relying solely on measures of narcissism derived from diagnostics of pathology, captures critical aspects of the adolescent experience. With these new measures in tow, as well as a theoretical background that supports the notion that adolescent narcissism is not wholly maladaptive, we hope that developmental research can expand on this topic.

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ADAPTIVE AND MALADAPTIVE NARCISSISM


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