CHAPTER 22

TEACHING MORAL DEVELOPMENT

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Anyone who takes up the profession of teaching, at any level, is taking up the cause of moral-character education. Indeed, there is universal consensus that education is value-laden and that moral education is inescapable in classrooms and schools. Moral values are implicated in the topics chosen or excluded for instruction; in the respect accorded for truth and the demand for excellence, good effort, and mastery. It is evident in the way groups are formed, relationships encouraged or discipline enforced. Values are intrinsic to what it means to develop, set goals, and aspire to achieve them. Indeed, Stengle and Tom (2006) insist that the language of morality is heard in schools every time issues of right relation and what is worth doing emerge in instructional lessons or within the interactions of students, teachers, and colleagues.

This is worth noting if only to counter the charge that morality has been expunged from schools. In fact, values are immanent to the life of classrooms and inevitable in any instance of teaching and learning. But there is legitimate concern that the moral work of teaching is too often remanded to the school’s hidden curriculum where it cannot be properly tended as an
intentional curricular objective (Lapsley, Holter, & Narvaez, 2013; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2013). Moreover, teachers receive almost no pre-service training in moral-character education unless a required course in educational psychology includes a brief module on moral stage or social domain theory. Unfortunately, such scant attention will hardly prepare teachers for moral-character education; and it all but assures that recent innovations in theory and research will find no place in the curriculum.

In this chapter, I outline a syllabus of topics that I use to teach moral development in a course that targets in-service, but novice, teachers. For at least a generation it was de rigueur to teach moral development by slogging through Kohlberg’s moral stage theory. I suspect this is still the drill if extant textbooks are any guide. Although I still teach Kohlberg’s theory and the cognitive developmental tradition more generally, I try to place these topics within a broader intellectual context that has resonance with instructional practice (at least this is my hope). There is not much current interest in the details of Kohlberg’s specific claims about moral development; and, indeed there is reason enough to think of it as a degenerating research program (Lapsley, 2011, 2005). But the cognitive-developmental tradition can still contribute to a vibrant pedagogy of moral-character education that will be found useful for the moral work of teaching.

The Hook

I admire Doug Lemov’s Teach Like a Champion (2010) because, while it is written for the practitioner, many of the teaching techniques that it touts are nonetheless vouchsafed by well-attested educational psychology literatures. One technique (“The Hook”) is to start a class or unit with an engaging exercise that inspires and excites students “to take the first step willingly” (p. 75). My hook for the moral development unit begins with a display of Breughel’s masterpiece Landscape with the Fall of Icarus. I ask students to report what they see in the painting. Students readily report obvious figures in the foreground—the ploughman tending his field, the shepherd looking away from the sea upwards towards the clouds. There is a ship sailing briskly off the shore and then—barely noticed: a boy’s white legs are about to disappear into the sea.

This painting inspired W. H. Auden to write one of his iconic poems, Musée des Beaux Arts, which is recited for class consideration. It begins “About suffering they were never wrong/the old Masters: how well they understood/Its human position: how it takes place/While someone else is eating or opening a window or just walking dully along.” The final lines of the poem come to the point:

In Breughel’s Icarus, for instance, how everything turns away
Quite leisurely from the disaster; the ploughman may
Have heard the splash, the forsaken cry;
But for him it was not an important failure; the sun shone
As it had to on the white legs disappearing into the green
Water, and the expensive delicate ship that must have seen
Something amazing, a boy falling out of the sky,
Had somewhere to get to and sailed calmly on.

The hook of this exercise is to reflect on how anyone can turn away leisurely from disasters that do not concern us. How is it we do not see the moral dimensions of our experience? How is it that we can “walk dully along” and take little notice of suffering and other dilemmatic features of our moral landscape? Which of us is like the ploughman in the painting, or the shepherd looking away, or the ship that takes notice of a “boy falling out of the sky” but sails calmly on?

The old Masters may have been on to something. One point to underscore is that what we see depends upon who we are. Individuals with well-developed moral faculties, or moral schemas chronically accessible, are likely to view the world through the prism of morality; to detect the “near occasions of sin” that are likely to put virtue to the test. To be a moral person, to be in trait possession of the virtues, is to be a person of a certain kind; and such a person appraises the social landscape differently than others who are morally obtuse, or whose virtues are less readily accessible. Some individuals never notice the moral features of their experience, or do not see them as readily as do others (while others see morality or virtue at stake in everything—which might be another problem).

What we see depends on who we are, but who we are can be understood in at least two ways relevant to the moral development unit: first, in terms of moral stage theory and the cognitive developmental tradition; and second, in terms of the literatures on character education. Put differently, moral perception depends upon structures of moral cognition and upon the structure of character. For a long time these two traditions have elided the common ground that exists between them; and the unit unfolds in the direction of an integrative perspective. But it is instructive to unpack the key claims of the two paradigms.

Two Paradigms: Moral Development and Character Education

Moral development and character development arose out of two very different intellectual traditions whose core assumptions and beliefs seemed difficult to reconcile. Indeed, whether one was a moral or character educator
was often revealing of paradigmatic commitments across a range of issues. The two paradigms can be usefully compared on three dimensions: orienting ethical theory; tradition of liberal education; and, preferred pedagogy (Lapsley & Yeager, 2014).

Ethical Theory

The moral development and character education paradigms align with different ethical theories. For example, the moral development paradigm is concerned with deontological aspects of morality, that is, with decisions about moral obligation and what one ought to do given the requirements of the moral law. It asks, “By what moral decision-making calculus can I resolve a dilemma and discern the proper course of action”? In this paradigm moral evaluation falls upon conduct—did I do the right thing? Was my behavior justified by the requirements of a moral principle, say, by Kant’s Categorical Imperative? Kohlberg’s moral stage theory illustrates this approach. It describes a sequence of moral reasoning that reveals increasing appreciation of the deontic requirements of the moral law as one approaches the final stage. Consequently, the aim of education is the development of deliberative competence to discern the moral point of view when faced with competing demands on justice.

If moral development aligns with Kantian ethical theory then traditional character education invokes Aristotle and has other priorities. The basic issue is not so much the qualities of moral reasoning but rather the qualities of agents. The goal is to become a person of a certain kind, a person whose behavior habitually displays the moral virtues. Hence, virtue ethics is the guiding ethical theory rather than Kantian deontology. Instead of asking “what should I do?” character education asks “what sort of person should I become?” Not surprisingly, the target of character education is the cultivation of habits, traits and virtues.

Traditions of Liberal Education

According to Kimball (1986), the idea of liberal education from antiquity to the modern era can be described by reference to two traditions that he terms philosophical and oratorical. Indeed, Kimball (1986) argues that the history of educational reform, including the reform initiatives of the twentieth century, oscillates between these two traditions. The same reforms are simply recycled as first one then the other tradition becomes ascendant. I argue that moral development reflects the philosophical tradition of liberal education; while traditional character education reflects imperatives of the oratorical tradition.

In the philosophical tradition truth is unsettled and elusive; we see through the glass darkly, as it were. And so, the search for truth is an act of discovery. Therefore, one must equip learners with philosophical dispositions to reason, to think critically, judge fairly, and to keep an open mind. In contrast, the oratorical tradition locates truth in great texts and traditional wisdom; and so the search for truth is an act of recovery. The truth must be imparted by oratorical transmission, by exhortation and enjoiner, so that learners are well equipped with the certain verities of the past. The oratorical tradition knows exactly what it wants to transmit and how. Thus, it is strong on content but weak on method (no one would mistake it for best practice). In turn, the philosophical tradition seems stronger on method but is weak on content. It encourages philosophical dispositions of inquiry but is agnostic about committing to anything in particular. As we will see, one source of tension between moral development and traditional character education was precisely on the content of moral-character formation and the pedagogy for making it come alive and stick.

Preferred Pedagogy

Not surprisingly, moral development and traditional character education prefer different approaches to instruction. The pedagogy of moral development is more indirect in the sense that it encourages children to actively construct moral meaning by means of transactive discussion of moral issues and dilemmas. Following Dewey, it wants to give children authentic opportunity to experience democratic participation and a sense of community. It encourages class meetings and cooperative groupings.

In contrast, traditional character educators are suspicious of indirect methods (Wynn & Ryan, 1997). Our common experience has already sorted out the required and acceptable schedule of virtues. The wisdom of generations has already identified desirable features of character—why should we let children debate and discuss them as if character were up for grabs? Hence, traditional character education more often favors direct didactic instruction, exhortation and “telling” for passing along the “Great Tradition” to students. The oratorical sympathies of traditional character education could not be clearer (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006).

Moral Stages and Just Communities

A Biographical Introduction

There is no getting around a consideration of Kohlberg’s moral stage theory. Although I dislike slogging through stages, there is value in considering the rhythm of moral development, and students often warm to the task. I introduce moral stage theory by placing it in the context of Kohlberg’s biography. I draw attention to three early formative experiences that formed the basis of his life’s work.
During the Second World War, and just out of high school, Kohlberg enlisted in the merchant marines where he was assigned to an escort ship in the Atlantic theater. When Nazi Germany was defeated Kohlberg took up another cause. He got involved in the movement to smuggle European Jews, who were remnant of the Holocaust, to Palestine. This was contrary to Allied policy and Britain set up a blockade to prevent wholesale immigration to Palestine. The boat on which Kohlberg served was stopped by the British Royal Navy and the crew was remanded to a British internment camp on Cyprus. Some months later Kohlberg and others were sprung by the Haganah, a Jewish paramilitary defense force, and spirited to an Israeli kibbutz where he stayed for about six months. Kohlberg made his way back to the United States, where he eventually earned a doctoral degree in clinical psychology at the University of Chicago. Doctoral dissertations typically draw no attention, but Kohlberg's dissertation provided preliminary evidence for a stage sequence of moral reasoning that would come to dominate developmental psychology for over five decades.

The Anti-Relativism Project

This biographical sketch is meant to introduce students to Kohlberg's motivation for proposing a theory of moral development. By the time he was their age he had undergone three profound moral experiences: as an enlisted soldier he fought against the Nazi ethos; his humanitarian work on behalf of European Jews collided with allied policy he thought unjust; and then there was his experience of communal egalitarian life on a kibbutz. These experiences motivated important ethical questions: How is one to justify the moral decisions that one makes? How are we to determine the adequacy of our moral commitments?

When he took up his doctoral studies these questions of justice were ever present. Which of the extant psychological systems of his time (behaviorism, psychoanalysis) could provide the intellectual resources to make sense of his struggle against Nazism and injustice? As it turned out, none of them could. Neither psychoanalysis nor behaviorism took a stand on how to determine the legitimacy of moral systems or else actively embraced ethical relativism. Kohlberg's life's work was to be a corrective to this. His moral stage theory was an attempt to devise the psychological resources to defeat ethical relativism, and along the way Kohlberg became one of the most famous developmental psychologists of the twentieth century.

Jean Piaget's genetic epistemology was crucial to Kohlberg's understanding of moral development; and it is hard to understand Kohlberg's project without making this point. In the cognitive developmental framework each forward movement in stages yields reasoning that is qualitatively better than predecessor stages. It is better because it is capable of more complex adaptations. The final stage in the sequence describes a mode of perfected operations that serves as the basis for evaluating the progressive nature of developmental change. To say that the goal of development is to attain a particular endpoint is to make not only an empirical claim about the natural course of development, but also an evaluative or normative claim. One is making implicit reference to a standard that allows one to distinguish progressive development from mere change, and the standard is instantiated in one's conceptualization of the endpoint. Developmental change, if it is to count as an instance of development, is evaluated in terms of how closely it approximates the "ideal equilibrium" represented by the final stage of the developmental process. So much depends, then, on the coherence of the final stage of a sequence because the final stage makes developmental explanation possible.

Thus, one can view movement through Kohlberg's stages as the dawning awareness that some moral perspectives are errant and inadequate, that others are preferred, and that there is a way to know the difference. It is the growing realization, as one approaches the moral ideal, as one closes in on the final stage, that moral dilemmas are not insolvable, that moral conflict is not intractable, and that consensus is possible if disputants are motivated by the moral point of view captured by the final stage of moral development. Put differently, ethical relativism is defeated by the attainment of the principled stages of moral reasoning (Lapsley, 2005).

Educational Implications

It is now clear that Kohlberg's theory is on the margins and no longer dominates social cognitive development (Lapsley, 2005). Indeed, Piaget's theory no longer drives the research agenda either, and there seems little interest among contemporary researchers to map developmental change around a conception of stage. Although there is notable longitudinal evidence in favor of Kohlberg's theory, the pace of stage change is turgid and there is little evidence of principled reasoning. Indeed, the final stage was dropped from the scoring manuals, which undermines developmental explanation of stage change. Moreover, there was prima facie refutation of two foundational claims: invariant sequence and the structured whole assumption. Attempts to repair the theory now have the look of ad hoc adjustments that reduced the scope of the theory to something cramped and narrow (e.g., to judgments of fairness derived from oral interviews). The theory now seems incapable of anticipating novel facts in the moral domain and, on this basis, it is a degenerating research program (Lapsley, 2011).

That said, Kohlberg's project has important educational implications. It underscores the importance of discussing moral dilemmas as they arise in lessons. Inducing cognitive disequilibrium by confronting students with higher stage arguments (within the limits of one stage) is still a valuable implication of the cognitive developmental tradition. Moreover, it would be a mistake to
limit the educational implications to dilemma discussion. Indeed, Kohlberg’s approach to moral education seemed less interested in moving students through the moral stages than in developing a school culture that is experienced by students as a just community (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989).

**Just Communities**

In a just community, students value the institution (e.g., the school is valued for its own sake and can obligate members to uphold group norms and responsibilities) and they value the school as a community (e.g., the sense of community is considered an entity apart from specific relationships). Moreover a school’s moral community can be revealed by the development of its collective norms. Are collective norms held out as an expectation of conduct that is enforced by the group? How willing are members to uphold collective norms, defend them and to confront violators, and take responsibility for enforcing the norm within the life of the school? Are the norms of the school “theirs” or “ours?”

To reach this level of community requires a change in school culture. It requires, for example, class meetings, moral discussion, giving students “voice-and-choice,” and a stake in devising and enforcing norms. Although no one is organizing schools in quite the way the Kohlberg team envisioned (e.g., with democratic decision-making and whole-school meetings to establish and defend norms), its insistence on developing community is well-grounded by contemporary educational science. Finding ways to give adolescents more autonomy, for example, or more “voice-and-choice,” is one way to improve the stage-environment fit of adolescents and schools. Effective schools with strong student achievement are marked by communal organization (and academic press) where school culture is experienced as a caring community. Kohlberg’s research program deserves some credit in getting us to that conclusion.

**Domain Theory and Implications**

If moral stage theory has been pushed to the margins then social domain theory has certainly stepped in to replace it. Domain theory’s central claim is that Kohlberg got it wrong when he suggested that conventional reasoning must be supplanted in a sequence of moral development. Instead, conventional reasoning is a domain distinct from moral reasoning (Turiel, 1983). Social reasoning about morality and conventions is bounded by domain because understanding of these issues arises out of different kinds of experience. Morality is bound up with issues of harm, rights, and the welfare of others. Convention is bound up with issues of social order. Children build up different ways of understanding the requirements of rights-and-welfare and the requirements of effective social organization, and can readily understand this domain distinction even as toddlers (Smetana, 1983).

Each domain comes to different understanding of rules and transgressions. Moral rules are universally applicable and unalterable by consensus. Conventional rules are arbitrary and binding but can be changed by consensus. It is a moral rule not to visit harm upon another, but a conventional violation to address teachers by their first name or to go up-the-down-staircase. Violation of moral rules is held to be more serious than conventional violations. Moreover, a third, personal domain has also been identified (Nucci, 1981) that includes private aspects of one’s life and behavior, such as what books to read, what friends to choose, how to dress and groom, what music to like, whether to masturbate or not, or whom to vote for. These are choices that resist social regulation and the demands of deontic moral obligation. It is a useful and engaging exercise to ask students to generate examples of social conventional rules in both families and schools.

It is not always noticed just how Piagetian domain theory is. The boundaries of domains are partial structures that are constructed on the basis of certain behavioral experiences. This is precisely the way Piaget described the emergence of domains of conservation. Cognitive groupings are based on overt actions that have become interiorized, made part of mental cognitive activity—but groupings always retain an element of content specificity just because they are based on different kinds of overt actions. Each grouping of operations is adaptive for its particular content, and some actions are easier to group than others.

I have always understood the construction of social domains to follow the logic of the construction of conservation domains. Piaget was also a domain theorist, and it was Turiel’s inspiration to push this Piagetian cognitive developmental insight into social cognitive development. Domains arise as interiorized cognitive constructions of behavioral experiences of certain kinds. But if I am right about this, then social domain theory is just about the last Piagetian theory still standing.

**Implications for Education**

One implication of social domain theory is that teachers should be sensitive to domain distinctions and calibrate discipline accordingly. Even young children are aware that rules fall into different domains, and that rule violations should not be treated identically. In other words, do not “moralize” about conventional violations. It diminishes the force of moral argument when it is sent chasing after matters of convention; but it also misses opportunities to engage student thinking about legitimate issues of classroom or school convention. Indeed, teachers can increase their influence as socialization agents when they are sensitive to domain distinctions in their disciplinary practices (Nucci, 2001).
A second implication is to recognize that many issues are a mixture of moral, conventional, and personal considerations, and it would be a mistake to treat complex issues solely from the standpoint of morality. Take the matter of peer inclusion and exclusion as an example. Wrapping this complicated issue solely in the discourse of morality will be ineffective because it taps into multiple social reasoning domains (Horn, Daddis, & Killen, 2008). It taps into moral concerns about fairness, harm, and discrimination (“It’s not fair to exclude him just because he is gay”), student conventions about group membership and functioning (“The group won’t work well with someone different in it”), and personal concerns about friendship selection (“I can be friends with whomever I want”).

A useful rule of thumb is to hold fast and advocate for moral considerations, negotiate social (household, school) conventions, and give wide latitude to the personal domain. Of course, rules of thumb will not resolve all conflicts. I suspect parents and teachers will want to park more issues under the moral domain than children find reasonable or fair; and children will have a more expansive view of the personal domain than adults can tolerate.

Modern Character Education

I noted earlier that moral development and character education seemed to spin out of two very different paradigms. Of the two paradigms, character education does not command as much attention as moral development in standard developmental and educational psychology coursework. It is also strangely absent from the curriculum of pre-service teacher education programs. Interestingly, the language of character and character education is loudly heard in a popular education press that otherwise pays scant attention to moral development.

But character education has moved beyond its traditional paradigmatic formulation and is hardly a uniform educational movement. In fact, modern character education is characterized by four rather different approaches that I group under three headings: Best Practice, Broad Character Education and Intentional Moral-Character Education. The first approach places no additional burden on teacher education programs; the second approach requires teachers to deliver curricula or programs in addition to best practice instruction; and the third approach addresses virtues and morality directly and asserts that moral self-identity is the aim of moral-character education.

Best Practice

On this view, character education is just good education. Teachers attend to the moral formation of pupils when they engage in teacher practices that maximize opportunities for student learning and build a classroom and

school culture that is caring and communal. Students who attend schools like this typically show a range of positive outcomes that are of interest to traditional character educators. If character education is just good education, then pre-service teachers and school leaders who are trained in these matters are also learning how to direct students’ behavioral outcomes towards desirable ends; and these ends will be deemed marks of good character.

The best practice approach aligns with principles of effective character education as promulgated by the Character Education Partnership (CEP, Character Education Partnership, 2010). For example, CEP Principle 6 insists that effective character education “includes a meaningful and challenging academic curriculum that respects all learners.” It calls for differentiated instruction, the development of thinking strategies and the minimization of external rewards to sustain motivation. In other words, CEP Principle 6 affirms that character education requires academic press. CEP Principle 2 (“defines character comprehensively to include thinking, feeling and doing”) endorses the cognitive-mediation perspective of constructivist learning. CEP Principle 3 (“Uses a comprehensive, intentional, proactive and effective approach to character development”) encourages teachers to have high expectations, to develop a sense of community by giving students “voice-and-choice” and a chance to shape group norms. CEP Principle 4 (“Creates a caring school community”) explicitly addresses the communitarian ethos that characterizes good schools. CEP 7 (“strives to foster students’ self-motivation”) endorses fostering intrinsic motivation to do well on academic tasks by encouraging growth and learning mindsets; and intrinsic motivation to do the right thing by building a climate of trust and respect, encouraging autonomy, and building shared norms through class meetings and shared decision-making.

In short, principles of effective character education endorse a set of well-attested pedagogical strategies that are considered best practice for teachers and school leaders. Moreover, it has the added virtue of requiring no significant alteration of pre-service teacher training (provided that training is already of high quality). Indeed, Narvaez and Lapsley (2008, p. 158) suggested that the “knowledge base that supports best practice instruction is coterminous with what is known to influence the moral formation of students.” Hence it is neither necessary nor desirable to treat general education and character education as two separate instructional objectives if indeed character formation is a precipitate of best practice education.

Broad Character Education

The second category requires something more than good teachers engaging in best practice instruction. Broad character education requires teachers to deliver special programs as an intervention or curriculum. Two options are evident. One adopts a public health prevention model and the language of developmental psychopathology to advocate for programs
that drive down risk factors and mobilize protective mechanisms. Many traditional character educators point to troubling epidemiological trends of youth disorder, for example, adolescent delinquency, dropping out of school, precocious sexual behavior, teen pregnancy, violence and substance use, and so on, as evidence that young people lack moral character (and that schools have ceased to teach it). Consequently, intervention and prevention programs that drive down these trends could reasonably be considered instance of character education if the outcome is good conduct. Similarly, anything that strengthens protective mechanisms for children exposed to psychosocial hazards would also count for moral-character education if the outcome minimizes risk behavior.

However, these programs are designed without recourse to the language of moral valuations, without reference to virtues, values or morality. It is difficult to credit moral-character education for outcomes driven by models of risk, resilience, and protection. In addition, the positive youth development movement has objected to over-reliance on risk behavior, deficits, and problems. In the view of this movement, problem-free is not fully-prepared, and so there is more work to do after reducing risk exposure and mobilizing protective mechanisms. Thus, a second approach to Broad Character Education focuses on the positive development of all students and on “performance” (vs. moral) character traits that underwrite success in school.

It is now impossible to teach moral development and character education without reference to the positive psychology of character. Peterson and Seligman (2004) identified 24 character strengths that are assigned to one of six universal virtues in their Values in Action classification. The virtues are Wisdom (creativity, curiosity, judgment, love of learning, perspective), Courage (bravery, perseverance, honesty, zest), Humanity (love, kindness, social intelligence), Justice (teamwork, fairness, leadership), Temperance (forgiveness, humility, prudence, self-respect), and Transcendence (appreciation of beauty and excellence, gratitude, hope, humor, spirituality). Character strengths are said to buffer stress and enable behaviors that maintain adaptation and positive youth development.

Grit is a character strength that has attracted the interest of educators (Duckworth & Quinn, 2009). It is defined as trait-level perseverance and passion for long-term goals in spite of challenges and setbacks. There is an emerging empirical profile that attests to the importance of grit for a variety of educational outcomes. Moreover, the literatures on grit and character strengths have led many educators to elevate the importance of “performance character” or “non-cognitive” factors in curricular planning. The KIPP charter school network has taken the lead in developing a character report card for each student that includes the following character strengths: grit, zest, optimism, gratitude, social intelligence and curiosity. These traits are the target of explicit socialization and instruction, which is evident upon any visit to a KIPP school. Providing opportunities for children to develop and practice these strengths is an important instantiation of KIPP’s credo “Work hard, be nice.” Curricular programs that emphasize growth mindsets and social-emotional learning would also fall under this heading.

Of course, performance character is not the same as moral character and so programs that tout gains in performance traits and character strengths should not be counted for what works in moral education. Indeed, character strengths could just as well be used for nefarious as for moral ends. Whether grit, for example, is good or bad depends upon the ends for which it is deployed. Therefore, a third approach has an explicit, intentional aim to develop the avowedly moral capacities of students.

Intentional Moral-Character Education

What if character education is defined not in terms of outcomes but in terms of treatment—what would that look like? In addition to commitments to constructivist best practice and academic press, in addition to teacher practices that support social belonging and character strengths, Intentional Moral-Character Education would be infused with the language of moral valuations. It would have an explicit theory of action whose objective is to influence the moral formation of children. It would amend the motto of positive youth development problem free is not fully prepared to say “but fully prepared is not morally adequate” (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006, p.162). It would acknowledge that there is still more work to do by way of moral formation after reducing risk behavior, developing competencies, and building character strengths.

We all want children and adolescents to be free of significant problems and to be learned, competent students. But we also want them to have a moral compass, to be conversant with ethical issues and to become persons who care about morality and who desire to have moral considerations govern their behaviors and aspirations. And insofar as all learning is specific, the language of values, morality, and virtue would have to be heard in classrooms; appeals to moral principles would have to be extracted from lessons. Schools would have to stand explicitly for core values, articulate and defend them, and animate them in all things in the life of the school.

Two additional CEP principles bring the values implications of character education out of the shadows. CEP principle 1 (“The school community promotes core ethical and performance values as the foundation of good character”) asserts that schools must come to consensus about core values that “affirm human dignity, promote the development and welfare of the individual, serve the common good, define our rights and responsibilities in a democratic society, and meet the classical tests of universality (i.e., Would you want all persons to act this way in a similar situation?) and reversibility (i.e., Would you want to be treated this way?).” The CEP nominates caring,
honesty, fairness, responsibility and respect for self and others as core ethical values; and diligence, effort, perseverance, critical thinking, and positive attitude as core performance values.

But the major point is not which values are selected but that some are, and that the selected values serve as the touchstone for everything that goes on in the school. Effective schools are those that are infused with a clear moral purpose that is out in the open, not hidden but transparent in the practice of teaching and learning, in the way relational trust, social belonging and a sense of community is cultivated, in the disciplinary practices of the school and the way it reaches out to families and communities. Importantly, effective schools also give students an opportunity to engage in moral action. The call-to-action is reflected in CEP Principle 5 (“The school provides students with opportunities for moral action”). The insistence that education include a commitment to moral action makes the CEP principles something more than a mere catalogue of instructional best practice, although they are certainly that as well.

**CONCLUSION**

I have presented three possible responses to the challenge of preparing pre-service teachers and aspiring school leaders for the moral work of teaching and of school leadership. Best Practice mobilizes the educational psychology literatures of constructivist learning, academic press and communal organization of schools to guide the formation of “good learners.” Broad Character education reduces the exposure of good learners to psychosocial hazards, reduces risk behavior, builds competencies, and fortifies the good learner with character strengths. Finally, Intentional Moral-Character Education transforms the Fortified Good Learner into a Moral Self.

These three responses should be considered moments in the moral formation of students and the moral work of teaching. The challenge for the educational sciences, and for schools of education, is to connect the dots so that these three moments are a seamless weave in the training of teachers and school leaders. The effective moral educator must first be an effective teacher who brings powerful lessons alive with pedagogical techniques that maximize student interest, engagement, and learning; and so the effective teacher will be skilled in the best practice attested by the learning sciences. But teachers skilled in the mechanics of best practice also need to count on the relational trust of colleagues and school leaders. It is the school leader who sets the tone and puts into place the school-wide structures and policies that build the communitarian ethos and sense of belonging so crucial to student success.

But, increasingly, the tools of effective teaching include the mobilization of character strengths and motivational orientations that sustain good effort in the face of academic challenges. The literatures on social-emotional learning, grit, and mindsets are particularly promising ways to fortify learning, and it is imperative that the instructional strategies that devolve from these literatures are folded into teacher training. But moral education requires pedagogical content knowledge in its own right, like any other instructional objective. Effective instruction will yield good outcomes across a range of outcomes of interest to educators, and such an effect would be catalyzed when fortified best practice is yoked to intentional commitment morality, virtues, and values (Lapsley et al., 2014).

**REFERENCES**


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**SECTION IV**

TEACHING RESEARCH METHODS, STATISTICS AND ASSESSMENT FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGISTS
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