Moral Formation in the Family: A Research Agenda in Time Future

Daniel Lapsley
University of Notre Dame

Contact
Department of Psychology
118 Haggar Hall
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Email: danlapsley@nd.edu

To appear in:

---T.S. Eliot (“Burnt Norton”)

It is now commonplace in the historiography of science to think about fields of study as communities of practice (Daston & Most, 2015). As Stern (2003, p. 186) put it, “Talk of practice has become widespread, not only in the philosophy of social science, but throughout philosophy, the humanities and the social sciences.” The “practice turn” directs attention of historians and philosophers of science to the actual activities of scientists in the production and validation of knowledge (Daston & Most, 2015; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina & Savigney, 2001). Indeed, to regard practice as the fundamental category of analysis promises to reframe traditional concerns of epistemology (Society for the Philosophy of Science in Practice, 2015) and displace traditional dichotomies (e.g., subject-object, scheme-content, belief-desire, rules-application, structure-action) as the starting point for understanding how mind, rationality and knowledge are constituted (Stern, 2003).

Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) also makes use of practice in his groundbreaking attempt to repair the intelligibility of virtue. On his account practice refers to “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized” (p. 187). Practice is thus a concept broader than the work of scientists. MacIntyre’s examples include farming (but not planting turnips), architecture (but not bricklaying), playing chess (but not skill at throwing a football). He adds the work of physicists, musicians, historians, anything that creates and sustains human communities, including families, cities and nations. He writes “the range of practices is wide: arts, sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the making and sustaining of family life, all fall under the concept” (p. 188). What is distinctive about practice is not only that it yields the realization of certain goods, but that it accords with standards of excellence that practitioners recognize as regulative and aspirational (and for which virtues are required to achieve). Although standards are not immune to criticism, “we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the best standards realized so far” (p. 190). This means, too, that practices
have a history that can be folded into narrative structures that help make sense of the tradition.

In a recent paper, Hicks and Stapleford (2016) work out the implications of MacIntyre's notion of practice for the historiography of science. In their view science is a communal practice that is collaborative, organized and goal directed; and necessarily involves boundary politics (to demarcate what is internal and external to the practice) and normative expectations about appropriate methodology, proper procedure, sound interpretation. Of course, there can be disagreement about these things, normative rules are not self-interpreting. Different labs might contest what is considered sound research, for example, or dispute the way key elements are defined or operationalized. Nonetheless the practice holds together, sociologically and politically, by a shared problematic and shared framework of accountability. One becomes initiated into a tradition; and its unfolding historical narrative provides the terms of reference for interpreting the past and for understanding the normative goals, challenges and achievements of the communal practice.

It is the historicity of communal practice that concerns me here. The history we tell of our research tradition is not a simple rehearsal of some essential, unchanging script. Indeed, there are likely debates about standards and goals and how to interpret the tradition. "Normative battles over the present thus entail, and are enacted through, arguments about history" (Hicks & Stapleford, 2016, p. 471). Hence the bounds of the tradition are not fixed. The tradition lives and breathes, is subject to argument and reevaluation, "since that is the only way to assess whether the practice is making progress, remaining static, or regressing—and hence the only way to judge whether and in which ways the practice ought to change" (Hicks & Stapleford, 2016, p. 471).

Hicks and Stapleford (2016) note that historical argument is a familiar notion in science, enshrined in the carefully parsed narrative of every introduction section of a scientific paper. More fundamentally the historical perspective is crucial to the methodology of scientific research programs championed by Lakatos (1978). On his view research programs (which themselves might be considered communal practices) are progressive so long as they continue to evolve, fend off refutation, digest anomaly, anticipate new predictions while accounting for the claims of rival programs. It is growth in knowledge that gives science its distinctive character. A research program is degenerating if it does none of these things. Of course, discerning whether research programs are progressing or degenerating is a comparative matter that requires an historical analysis of the research tradition. Historiography is an inescapable part of the scientific enterprise.

My purpose for discussing communal practice, tradition and historiography is to motivate a central theme of the present chapter, which is that the study of moral development is a communal practice in the requisite sense; and that a consideration of the present status of research on moral development in the family and its future prospects necessarily requires an historical argument. As Hicks and Stapleford (2016, p. 472) put it, "if science is a communal practice...then the history of science is always a potential intervention into the practice of contemporary science.” Arguments about the present, and, indeed, the future, “always entail reinterpretations of the past” (p. 472). On this score, the epigram from T.S. Eliot’s (1943) Burnt Norton is particularly apt.

In this chapter I offer several ideas for the future development of research programs on moral formation in the family. But my squinty peer into the future begins with cautionary lessons from the history of the communal practice known as the “cognitive developmental approach to socialization” (Kohlberg, 1969). Taking this historical perspective can be considered (following Hicks and Stapleford) an intervention on the practice of contemporary research; and it provides cleaner lines-of-sight for future development of the field.

Indeed, we are all heirs of the tradition of “moral development” (as attested by the very title of the present volume), although there are still arguments over how to interpret the history and the lessons to learn from it. There are arguments still over where to draw the boundaries of the tradition, whether prosocial behavior should count as “moral,” for the appraisal of competing scientific research programs. The “Lakatosian” element in MacIntyre’s writing warrants closer analysis.

---

1 MacIntyre (1984, see Postscript) describes how to appraise the claims of rival ethical traditions in much the same way as Lakatos (1978) describes
example, or whether the language of virtue and character is intelligible within the communal practice, or whether the boundary can include infancy and early life, or constructs like attachment, temperament, autobiographical memory, identity and personality, among others. On one level this continuous argument over fundamentals, over the “goods of the tradition,” is entirely salutary, for “continuities of conflict” are sure indicators of vitality in a research tradition (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 222). Yet such conflict denotes vitality only if it leads to a progressive problem-shift in our understanding of the scientific agenda before us.

**Historical Considerations**

The present volume raises at least three interesting questions for the moral development tradition, which I take up before reflecting on possible future directions in research. One question is why it has taken so long for the tradition to take up moral development in the family. A second question concerns whether moral development connotes the same thing in the present context than it did in the formative decades of the tradition. A third question concerns the lessons to be learned for future development of the tradition from an historical consideration of how it has fared. I have argued that the Kohlberg stage-and-sequence paradigm is now rightly considered a degenerating research program, in the Lakatosian sense, although I did not always think so (Lapsley, 2011, 2005; Lapsley & Serlin, 1984). These questions suggested by “time past” will prepare consideration of a research agenda in “time future.”

**The Family Context**

The focus on moral formation in the family seems long overdue. Parents are clearly the primary and most important source of moral tuition, yet the moral development tradition took scant notice. For the Kohlberg team, at least, moral education was mostly a matter of what happens in schools. One reason for the apparent neglect of the family as a context for moral development can be traced to Piaget (1932), whose famous book is a sustained polemic against the standard view that children are socialized into morality by the exertions of parents (and that only the worst is to be expected of peer influence).

Yet Piaget is quite harsh in his estimation of what passes for moral education in the home. “The majority of parents”, he writes, "are poor psychologists, and give their children the most questionable of moral teachings” (p. 191). Oftentimes adults are overbearing, opaque, and harsh in their dealings with a child, to such an extent that moral and intellectual egocentrism is strengthened, rather than overcome. Simply observe the "average parent” deal with a child “in trains, especially on Sunday evenings after a day’s outing" (p. 192). Piaget continues:

> How can one fail to be struck on such occasions by the psychological inanity of what goes on: the efforts which parents make to catch their children in wrong-doing instead of anticipating catastrophes and preventing the child by some little artifice or other...; the pleasure taken in inflicting punishments; the pleasure taken in using authority, and the sort of sadism which one sees so often in perfectly respectable folk, whose motto is that ‘the child’s will must be broken’, or that he must be 'made to feel a stronger will than his.'

The constraint exercised by one generation upon another explains the source and persistence of childish moral notions, in Piaget’s view, notions that are subverted only by the more equalitarian interactions to be found in the peer arena.

A second reason for the neglect of family in the moral development tradition is simply that the Kohlberg stage sequence has nothing much to say about early moral formation in any context. The moral stage model overlooks the vast terrain of childhood insofar as its developmental levels do not take off much before early adolescence; and even then, deal with matters (how to resolve hard-case hypothetical justice dilemmas in oral interviews) that elide the more typical concern of parents (how to raise children of good moral character). Moreover, moral stage assessment is a methodological challenge for anyone but verbally facile individuals, and is certainly out of bounds for children. Although there were influential studies of young children’s understanding of positive justice, role-taking and other dimensions of interpersonal understanding (e.g., Damon, 1975; Selman, 1980), the family context was not central to this work. Fortunately, the present volume is untethered from the traditional stage-and-sequence assumptions and methodologies, and so opens up new possibilities of research across a broader array of topics within the family context.
Whither Moral Development?

MacIntyre (1984) famously argued that contemporary moral debate seems interminable because of the apparent conceptual incommensurability of rival moral traditions. We possess no rational way of appraising the arguments of different moral perspectives largely because of deformity in our use of moral language, a deformity that has historical origins. He writes:

> What we possess, if this is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess, indeed, simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have...lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality (p. 2).

On this view, we use moral terms as linguistic survivals from once coherent moral schemes that have not survived their historical and cultural context. The term “virtue,” for example, is used as if it’s meaning is invariant and fixed rather than inextricably linked to the sociology of particular historical eras (Homeric and Aristotelian virtues, Thomistic virtues and those touted by Jane Austen and Benjamin Franklin—MacIntyre’s favorite examples—are quite different from each other).

Something like this attends the contemporary use of the term “moral development.” In the context of the “cognitive developmental approach to socialization” the term was firmly anchored and made sensible by developmental assumptions of Piagetian genetic epistemology and philosophical assumptions of Kantian deontology. In this ethic, the central questions are “What ought I to do?” “What is my duty?”, “What does the moral law require?” The basic facts, then, concern judgments of obligation. The object of moral appraisal is conduct. The moral qualities to cultivate are powers of discernment and decision-making. And in Kohlberg’s developmental psychology the prescriptive implications of the moral law are all much better appreciated at the higher stages of moral reasoning where one’s moral deliberation would invoke Kantian categorical imperatives and Rawlsian thought experiments.

This understanding of morality was assumed even by social domain theory that otherwise challenged to good effect the main theoretical claims of the Kohlberg paradigm. Moral judgments are matters of obligation. They are prescriptive, unalterable and have universalizable intent. But note that under these criteria prosocial reasoning and prosocial behavior are not admitted to the moral domain insofar as prosocial behavior, by definition, is completely voluntary rather than obligatory. If true, this might give readers cause to wonder if the present volume is mistitled if so many of its chapters are devoted to behavior and reasoning in the prosocial domain. But here I would argue that the issue of whether to fold prosocial behavior under the heading of moral development is a linguistic survival, a fragment of a conceptual scheme (following MacIntyre) that we have inherited from an intellectual context that no longer has force. The cognitive developmental approach to socialization is no longer regnant, and to insist on its deontological reading of morality as the sole target of investigation worthy of the label ‘moral development” is no longer compelling.

Indeed, it is now better recognized that the cognitive developmental approach never did describe morality as such but rather a certain view of moral judgment from a particular ethical tradition which is Kantian. Absent those commitments there is no reason why prosocial topics, such as helping and sharing, or topics that emerge from other ethical traditions, such as character and virtue, should not find a place under the heading of moral development (in which case the volume is not mistitled after all). This is an example of how historical considerations can serve as an intervention on the boundary politics of what is and is not legitimate communal practice.

Lessons Learned

Historical considerations also offer a cautionary lesson concerning the future direction of research on moral development in the family. The main burden of the cognitive developmental project in the moral domain was to secure the psychological basis for rejecting ethical relativism. Ethical relativism asserts not only that moralities are plural but that there is no rational basis for deciding among them. But developmental stage criteria (it was argued) provides one. The moral reasoning characteristic of later occurring stages is better than the reasoning of earlier stages because it is the product of development. To say that something has developed is to say that its mode of operation is better; and better because it is more
stable, more capable of executing complex accommodations, better because it more closely approximates the psychological and moral ideal, the telos of development (instantiated as the final stage in the sequence). It is good and better for cognitive operations to be like this, to be adaptive rather than non-adaptive; to be ideal rather than partial; to be enduring rather than temporary; to be stable rather than unstable (Lapsley, 2005).

This tendency of cognitive (and moral) structures to develop in the direction of increasing structural (and moral) adequacy makes it possible, indeed, inevitable, that empirical claims about what is the case in the natural course of development will be conflated with value-laden claims about what counts as “good” development. For Kohlberg, factual-empirical and evaluative-normative will always be mutually implicated in moral development research (Kohlberg, 1971). Hence, from the perspective of principled reasoning, the moralities of conventional and pre-conventional developmental levels can be rejected as inadequate. But if some moral perspectives can be judged inadequate then ethical relativism is defeated. There does exist a criterion to pass judgement on morality after all and it is a developmental one. Ethical relativism as an intellectual possibility can be rejected but only from the perspective of the highest levels of moral reasoning.

But the pursuit of an empirical basis for refuting ethical relativism had the unintended consequence of isolating moral development research from other psychological literatures that might have provided useful intellectual resources for addressing its empirical challenges. Instead, entire lines of research were ruled out of bounds if they were considered a slippery slope to ethical relativism. Hence, research on selfhood and personality, the mechanisms of internalization, the study of moral dispositions or traits, or of moral emotions, were deemed suspect (Lapsley & Hill, 2008). By closing the door on sources of integrative possibility moral stage theory became increasingly marginalized, something cramped and narrow, busy with repair and defense, turned in upon itself, unable to anticipate novel facts or to turn recalcitrant ones to its own advantage. In this way moral stage theory became a degenerating research program.

Once again, the historiography of moral development can serve as an intervention on contemporary practice. The lesson to learn from this historical account is that possibilities for theoretical integration should always be pursued. We should be in a position to learn from the theories, constructs and methodological tactics of other communal practices to build the more powerful, most comprehensive theory. Indeed, there is something about the rhythm of science that pulls for more inclusive and more strongly integrative theory; and we should be wary of putting up a priori roadblocks to easy commerce among communal practices.

In the remainder of the chapter I make three general suggestions about where to find integrative possibilities for building the comprehensive developmental theory of moral development in the family. I will first suggest that moral socialization research will find cause to reach out to the literatures of personality and personality development; and by doing so will discover that lines of research on such topics as event representations, autobiographical memory, attachment and temperament will be crucially relevant to any account of moral development in the family. Relatedly, there are philosophical resources, mostly in virtue ethics, that can provide a rich vocabulary for understanding the goals and practices of character formation in the family (Annas, Narvaez & Snow, 2016). Second, research on the importance of early life will continue to draw research interest and have important implications for the moral socialization of children. Finally, I will suggest that investigations of certain qualities of parents beyond “parenting style” or “discipline practice” will be strong additions to the research agenda. These qualities are suggested by research in the educational and learning sciences, as well as lifespan personality development.

Moral Formation as Sociopersonality Development

A recent Pew Research Center study (2014) asked a representative sample of adults to rate the relative importance of teaching certain values to children. Of particular interest was whether the values marked as important varied by adults’ ideological orientation (ranging from “consistent liberal” to “consistent conservative”) and other demographic characteristics (e.g., age, level of education, religious affiliation). Participants were also asked to select the three most important values to teach children from the list of twelve. The results showed both consensus and disagreement. For example, just about everybody thought responsibility should be an important target of child-rearing; and helping others was also widely endorsed across the ideological spectrum. Clear
majors considered hard work and good manners important qualities to teach children.

But ideological differences emerged for empathy for others, curiosity and creativity, with consistent liberals endorsing these values by wide margins (82%-86%) compared to consistent conservatives (55%-63%). An ideological divide was also evident when participants were asked to nominate three most important values to teach children. Among consistent conservatives, religious faith tied with responsibility for the top spot. Consistent liberals rated empathy as their second choice behind responsibility (conservatives rated empathy much lower); and helping others was rated more highly by liberals than conservatives.

With respect to age, older adults (over 65) were more likely to prioritize teaching religious faith and obedience than were adults under 30, who were more likely to emphasize creativity. College-educated adults placed a premium on teaching children empathy, curiosity, tolerance and persistence. High-school educated adults more often valued obedience, religious faith and good manners. Not surprisingly, those who report a religious affiliation (and 60% of white evangelical Protestants) say that religious faith is among the most important qualities to teach children.

The list of 12 values presented to participants to rate were generated by the study design. Undoubtedly a rather different (but no less interesting) sense of what values are important to teach children would result if the list contained twelve other traits, or if participants generated their own lists. That said, the Pew Research Center study (2014) underscores a number of important points. For example, parents seem to have clear preferences about which values should be the target of their socialization; and some of the values they think important do not track the way researchers partition the domain of study (or alternatively, would not be considered moral or even prosocial values).

Parents also bring more to socialization than oft-studied parenting style. The Pew Research Center data draws attention to parents' ideological orientation as a source of what to prioritize in values education, and to variables such as parental age, level of education and religious faith commitments. I will have more to say about this below, but suffice to say here that the evolution of research programs on the family context of moral development should examine those factors that parents bring with them (beyond parenting style) that creates the targets and goals of moral formation, such as the variables reported in the Pew Research Study (2014): political-ideological orientation, faith commitments, level of education. The study of how of religious practice within the family might influence moral socialization is of particular interest (Hardy, this volume).

The Pew Research Center study (2014) also suggests a more general point. No matter parents’ political or religious commitments, their age or level of education, or which specific list of values they endorse as targets of socialization----all parents want the same thing. They want to raise kids to become persons of a certain kind, persons who exhibit dispositions that are desirable and praiseworthy, who are persons of good character in trait-possession of important virtues. Parents might not always agree on which praiseworthy traits are important to emphasize, as the Pew study illustrated, but it a certainty that for parents the goal of socialization is not stage development but the formation of persons. Moral formation is just a particular kind of personality development. If so, a clear research agenda suggests itself: find ways to integrate insights from personality psychology and personality development into accounts of moral socialization.

**CAPS Model and Big Five**

The cognitive-affective processing system theory of personality, or the CAPS model (Mischel & Shoda, 2008, 1995; Cervone & Shoda, 1999), is a social-cognitive account of dispositional coherence that holds much promise for moral development researchers. This model assumes that the activation of mental representations is a critical feature of coherent personality functioning. These representations “include knowledge of social situations, representations of self, others and prospective events, personal goals, beliefs and expectations, and knowledge of behavioral alternatives and task strategies” (Cervone & Shoda, 1999, p. 18), and are variously conceptualized as schemas, scripts, prototypes, episodes, competencies and similar constructs (Mischel, 1990). It is the distinctive organization of these social-cognitive units, their mutual influence and dynamic interaction that give rise to various configurations of personality. Indeed, social cognitive units are assumed to be the cognitive carriers of dispositions (Cantor, 1990).
The CAPS model is now widely implicated in contemporary accounts of moral character (Miller, 2014) and moral personality (Lapsley, 2016a); and is well-suited to contribute to developmental accounts of moral formation. This is partly because constructs such as scripts and schemas are close to ongoing developmental research that can be turned in the direction of morality and character. Judgments, affects, temperaments, internal working models – these are progressively organized as cognitive-affective systems to provide the dispositional readiness to respond in characteristic ways to features of our environment that demand an ethical response. Moreover, the CAPS model aligns with the best insights of developmental science in its insistence that the cognitive-affective system is in reciprocal dynamic interaction with changing social contexts, and that a stable behavioral signature can be found at the intersection of person x context interactions. Furthermore, the CAPS model does not assume that all relevant cognitive processing is controlled, deliberate and explicit, and carves out significant explanatory space for affective processes in dispositional coherence.

The Big Five approach, with its emphasis on broad-band dispositional traits, comes more naturally to discussions of the taxonomy of personality, and there have been useful attempts to sort out the developmental grounding of individual trait differences in early life (McAdams, 2015). It is commonly argued that infant temperament canalizes into recognizable traits by early childhood (Rothbart & Bates, 2006; Rothbart, Ahadi & Evans, 2000). Extraversion and neuroticism emerge, for example, from biologically-driven temperament dimensions of positive and negative emotionality, respectively. How to organize characteristic emotional tendencies into stable patterns of behavior is the challenge of early personality development (McAdams, 2015). How to orient stable patterns of behavior to an ethical compass is the challenge of moral development.

Although the social cognitive and Big Five approaches have been likened to two independent disciplines of personality psychology (Cervone, 1991), the distinction need not be drawn too starkly (Mischel & Shoda, 1994; Lapsley & Hill, 2009). Caspi, Roberts and Shiner (2005) assert, for example, that the distinction between traits and social cognitive units of personality is exaggerated; and that the two approaches are not only complementary and mutually informative, but also capable of useful integration. Whole trait theory, for example, views social cognitive mechanisms as the explanatory side of traits (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015). From the perspective of the Cybernetic Big Five, traits are saturated with situational specificity and require eliciting conditions that social cognitive capacities (I would argue) are likely to notice (DeYoung, 2015).

Furthermore, in his account of a new Big Five, McAdams (2015; McAdams & Pals, 2006) describes the young toddler as an actor who must learn scripts in order to calibrate the performance of emotion in ways that fit the requirements of the family stage. But the same developmental processes that yield traits as outcomes also build social cognitive knowledge structures (Lapsley, 2016b). How else should the budding extravert, say, size up the limits and opportunities of a social setting except by the activation of relevant social cognitive schemas. Hence, as Caspi et al (2005, p. 461) note, “By integrating social cognitive constructs (e.g., mental representations, encoding processes) into research on traits, developmentalists can advance understanding of how traits are directly manifested at different ages.”

Thompson (this volume, 2006, 1998) has written persuasively about early socio-personality development that appeals to temperament, attachment, conscience and other developmental considerations; and he draws attention to the emergence and elaboration of prototypic knowledge structures in the early toddler years that lay the social-cognitive groundwork for the self-as-actor (following McAdams). We are so used to seeing development psychology balkanized into topical areas that one might wonder if attachment theory, for example, is at home in moral psychology, when in fact the entire panoply of developmental topics that coalesce under the heading of socio-personality development is the very foundation of moral development.

Indeed, it is difficult to see how any adequate account of moral development can be written without appeal to the relational framework of internal working models, without understanding how the mutually-responsive orientation of parent-child relationships and its goodness-of-fit with children’s temperament, serves to underwrite conscience, moral internalization and the development of the moral self (Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Kim, & Yoon, 2010; Thompson, 2009) and virtuous character (Thompson & Lavine, 2016). Attachment theory is fundamental to moral development.
development, certainly, and so are many other developmental literatures that build-out the emerging socio-personality dispositional and cognitive capacities of youngsters.

**Event Representations, Autobiographical Memory and the Moral Self**

In addition to attachment theory and socio-personality development, the study of children’s event representations and the development of episodic and autobiographical memory also holds promise for moral psychology (Lapsley, 2016a). Indeed, there is broad consensus that early development of autobiographical memory is inextricably linked with the emergence of the self-concept and felt continuity of identity (Beike, 2013; Black & Alea, 2008; Howe, 2004; Welch-Ross, 1995). On one account the development of the moral self is likely built upon the foundation of generalized event representations and the behavioral scripts and episodic memories that result from them (Lapsley, 2016a; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004).

Event representations have been called the basic building blocks of cognitive development (Nelson & Gruendel, 1981). They are working models of how social routines unfold (“getting ready for bed” “going to McDonald’s”) and what one can expect of social experience. Event representations are progressively elaborated in the early dialogue with caregivers who help children review, structure and consolidate memories in script-like fashion so that event-specific knowledge gets folded into broader narratives that helps children understand the relation of self to temporal-causal aspects of their experience (Fivush, Kuebli & Chubb, 1992; Nelson & Fivush, 2004).

How these social cognitive units are transformed into autobiographical memory is the “characterological turn” of significance for moral development. At some point, specific episodic memories and behavioral scripts must become integrated into a narrative that references a self whose story it is. Autobiographical memories, too, like event representations, are co-constructed, scaffolded and coached within a “web of interlocution” (to use a phrase from Taylor, 1989). Parents teach children how to construct narratives by the questions they ask of past events. Questions like “What happened when you pushed your sister? “Why did she cry? What should you do next?” --- helps children organize events into personally relevant autobiographical memories which provide, as part of the self-narrative, action-guiding scripts (“I share with her” “I say sorry’) that becomes frequently practiced, overlearned, habitual and automatic. And parents who engage children in rich elaborative discourse help them identify the key features that are to be remembered, their sequence, causal significance and timing (Schneider & Bjorklund, 1998); and tend to have children who have more sophisticated representations of their past (Reese & Fivush, 1993; Reese, Halden & Fivush, 1993).

Hoffman’s (1975) notion of induction and victim-centered discipline can be read in this way, as the sort of elaborative discourse that builds out the child’s autobiographical self-memory with morally salient features. This discourse might also include moral character attributions so that moral notions become part of the child’s emerging autobiographical self-narrative of “who I am” as a person. In this way parents co-construct the social cognitive schemas that are chronically accessible as part of the child’s character. The developing self-narrative helps children structure their experience and make sense of their actions. Keeping the narrative going is at the heart of self-identity; it is the stories we live by that holds the personality together (McAdams, 2015, 2003). As MacIntyre (1984, p. 216) put it, “Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutters in their actions as in their words.”

Autobiographical memory, then, is a complex cognitive and relational construct that holds promise for understanding the emergence of social cognitive capacities crucial to formation of the narrative self and moral personality (Fivush & Haden, 2003). There is also a robust literature on autobiographical memory in the clinical science and developmental psychopathology literatures (Valentino, 2011). For example, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) propose a model of the self-memory system that is driving research on autobiographical memory. In their model, autobiographical memory is arranged as a series of knowledge modules that are constructed hierarchically in terms of memory specificity. At the most general level are memories of life-span events that cover broad aspects of a person’s life (“when I was in graduate school”). At the next level are memories of general events that were often repeated (“when I was in Professor Enright’s class”); and then event-specific memories (“learning about moral development”). In generative recall a cue guides a controlled, top-down search of the memory system usually beginning with
autobiographical events in the intermediate general range but then moving down the memory hierarchy to retrieve event specific memories. Of course, with autobiographical memory the cue is typically a self-representation, a self-belief or other self-related information.

But what if self-representations are negative? What if depressogenic self-beliefs are chronically accessible and easily primed? Memory retrieval process often halts at the general level making it difficult to access specific event memories (Williams, 2006; Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, Hermans, Raes, Watkins & Dalgliesh, 2007), leading to the overgeneral autobiographical memory effect. For example, the cue selfish might activate negative self-beliefs “I am stingy and ungenerous with my time and money”, which leads to rumination about information that might support these self-beliefs, but without retrieving memory all the way down of a specific episode in which one was selfish.

Overgeneral autobiographical memory is a risk factor for depression (Kuyken & Dalgliesh, 2011; Rawal & Rice, 2012; Romero, Vazquez & Sanchez, 2014; Stange, Hamlat, Hamilton, Abramson & Alloy, 2013) and a vulnerability factor for a range of psychopathological symptoms (Gutenbrunner, Salmon & Jose, 2017; Hitchcock, Nixon & Weber, 2013). It is characteristic of individuals who have trauma-based emotional disorders; or who have been targets of assaults on the self-system through abuse or maltreatment (Valentino, Toth & Cicchetti, 2009; Williams, et al., 2007).

According to the CaR-FA-X model (Williams, 2006), three mechanisms are proposed to underlie overgeneral autobiographical memory: capture-and-rumination (“CaR”), functional avoidance (“FA”) and impaired executive control (“X”). Capture and rumination occur when self-related information triggers ruminative processes thereby “capturing” cognitive resources and disrupting retrieval (as in the selfish example above). Functional avoidance refers to the passive avoidance of specific (traumatic) memories in the service of affect regulation. Impaired executive control prevents successful event retrieval because of a deficit in attentional resources. Overgeneral autobiographical memory results when top-down generative recall is aborted prematurely because of one or more of these mechanisms (Conway & Playdell-Pearce, 2000).

There is now mounting evidence to support key claims of the CaR-FA-X model (Crane, Heron, Grunnell, Lewis, Evans & Williams, 2014; Sumner, 2012). How people recall their past, either with specificity or generality, has important implications for psychological functioning. But what are the implications of this literature for moral development? If autobiographical memory is diagnostic of assaults on personality and selfhood as a result of maltreatment and trauma, then it should also be possible to use autobiographical memory as a marker of positive (and negative) development of the moral self. The negative self-beliefs that lead to capture-and-rumination in the CaR-FA-X model are also co-constructed in the familial web-of-interlocution just as more positive and negative conceptions of moral self-beliefs; and so, there is every reason to think that the imprint of both positive and negative self-constructions should be reflected in autobiographical memory. Indeed, investigations of the role of autobiographical memory in sustaining moral dispositions might be considered the positive psychology of autobiographical memory research.

Investigations of the memory-self system in autobiographical memory might also help understand an interesting phenomenon. It is almost a cliché that individuals convicted of notorious crime or who are caught out in egregious moral failure nonetheless proclaim “This is not who I am,” and “I am still a good person.” No matter the pervasive stain on one’s reputation and all evidence to the contrary there is seemingly a deeply-felt need to build a wall of moral probity around a core conception of self. Indeed, moral agency may be crucial to what it means to be a person. As Carr (2001) put it “although there are other senses in which human agents may be regarded as persons, the most significant sense in which they are persons is that in which they are moral agents.” This sense of being a moral person is worth protecting for the sake of our agency, and the mechanisms of the CaR-FA-X model might show us how. Perhaps it is accomplished as a result of cognitive capture of a self-representation or functional avoidance of another. Perhaps instances of virtue and vice are differentially available in autobiographical memory in a way that implicates capture-and-rumination and functional avoidance of certain event-specific memories (of that time when I was that horrible person, for example). Perhaps autobiographical memory retrieval is influenced by moral emotions, such as guilt and shame. Finding a way to integrate the clinical and developmental literatures on autobiographical memory, and bending
it in the direction of moral development is an exciting prospect for future research.

Moral Development in Early Life

One prominent trend in moral development research is its focus on early life (Lapsley & Carlo, 2014). There is mounting evidence that infants and toddlers show a greater range of morally-relevant competencies than was thought possible just a couple decades ago (Brownell, 2013; Hamlin, 2013; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). In the present volume, the neurophysiological (Hastings) and genetic (Knafo) foundations of moral development and parenting are explored; and Narvaez makes a compelling case that early brain development conduces for moral receptivity and other capacities when infants and toddlers are raised within the evolved developmental niche. I noted earlier, too, how early social cognitive development, including attachment processes and the development of autobiographical memory, underwrite the development of the moral self. But I want to make special note of a pioneer on early moral development and a more recent promising line of research that underscores the promise of locating the origins of moral development in the first months of life.

The pioneer is Robert Emde and his colleagues (Emde, Biringen, Clyman, & Oppenheim, 1991; Emde, 2016) whose article on the “moral self of infancy” was far ahead of its time. On their view the origin of the moral self is linked to biologically prepared motives and procedural knowledge. The early self develops procedurally, that is, the infant’s behavior is organized, coherent, rule-governed, but not always on the basis of explicit rules but of those acquired piecemeal through daily interactions with caregivers. And what drives procedural knowledge are five biological motives that are built into our species by evolution and then consolidated into an affective core.

The motives are Activity (the basic tendency to explore and extend mastery), Self-Regulation (the propensity to regulate physiology and behavior in the service of “built-in” developmental goals), Social Fittedness (infants are pre-adapted for initiating, maintaining and terminating interactions, e.g., regulating the behavior of caregivers by gaze and smiling, behavioral synchrony and joint visual attention), Affective Monitoring (monitor experiences according to what is pleasurable, with infant affect guiding parental behavior and emotional communication by social referencing increasingly salient by 6 months), and Cognitive Assimilation (infants seek out the novel to make it familiar).

But the operation, activation and consolidation of basic motives requires a sensitive, responsive infant-caregiver relationship. The affective core requires a responsive rearing context for optimum development. Inborn biological propensities are progressively organized in the context of expectable infant-caregiver relationship experiences that result in the rudiments of a moral self: a sense of behavioral reciprocity, attention to norm violations (and hence appreciation of norms) and a capacity for empathy sharing.

Emde and colleagues (1991) describe the optimum parenting context by reference to a pantheon of great developmental theorists, some of whom are sadly neglected in contemporary discourse on child development. For example, early caregiver-infant interactions are described as “affective dialogues” (Spitz), “good-enough mothering” (Winnicott), and sensitive, mutual attunement to infant’s emotional signals and gestures (Bowlby). The caregiver’s regulatory role in structuring the continuity of early experience is described as the “holding” or “facilitating environment” (Winnicott), emotional “refueling” (Mahler) and “mirroring” support (Kohut). Bowlby’s attachment theory is, of course, well-known to developmental science, but the work of Spitz, Mahler, Winnicott and Kohut also present with strong integrative possibilities; and the recovery of their many searching insights for understanding socialization and development of the self is one strong attraction of the Emde et al. (1991) paper.

Emde’s account of the moral self was prophetic. It anticipated, for example, Narvaez’s claim (this volume) that the early rearing experience of newborns sets up conditions for ongoing neurobiological development of the infant brain that has significance for later moral development. It drew attention to the important role of relational synchronies, shared positive affect, and supportive parental “facilitating environments” for building the foundation of conscience (Laible & Thompson, 2000; Laible, this volume; Thompson, this volume). His notion of a biologically-prepared affective core preceded Hamlin’s (2013) argument for an innate moral core; and also claims regarding innately prepared moral intuitions (e.g., Haidt &
Kasebir, 2010). Moreover, Emde’s work underscores a point made by Thompson (2006), that the most useful model for understanding early sociopersonality development is a neo-Vygotskian one that “emphasizes the shared creation of knowledge through the interaction of the child with a partner in everyday activities” (p. 84); as opposed to a socialization model that assumes that development is something that active adults do to passive children, or a constructivism model that assumes that children figure it out for themselves.

A promising recent approach to the emergence of moral character in infancy is work done in Jessica Sommerville’s (2015) lab. Her research program documents five interesting findings: 1) infants at 15 months are sensitive to the fair distribution of things; 2) infants prefer social actors who are fair (they also prefer actors who are prosocial rather than antisocial, see Hamlin & Wynn, 2011); 3) this preference for the fairness norm is a developmental phenomenon insofar as it is not evident at 6 months and is transitional at 9 months; 4) these findings cannot be attributed to statistical learning of perceived regularities; and 5) children tolerate inequality and unfairness so long as the “in-group” is favored.

I will note in passing that the developmental shift in detecting violations of the justice norm from 6 to 15 months also overlaps with the existential-to-categorical shift in early self-development (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979), so perhaps a common developmental process drives early understanding of fairness and increasing self-knowledge (or else many developmental achievements are in the service of self-development – a conclusion that might better justify Sommerville’s use of the term “moral character”). Sommerville (2015) suggests two socialization mechanisms that underlie this early developmental appreciation of the fairness norm: 1) opportunities for infants to share in naturalistic settings, say, during play episodes with parents; and 2) certain qualities of parents, such as their self-reported empathy. I will return to the “certain quality of parents” below, but Sommerville’s research allows us to add quality of play to quality of discourse as possible mechanisms that encourage moral formation in early life.

**Parent Characteristics**

The characteristic of parents that is most often investigated in family socialization research is parenting style (e.g., Mounts, this volume). I have suggested several additional features of parents that could bear further investigation with respect to moral development in the family: political-ideological orientation, faith commitments and religious practices, elaborative reminiscing, the quality of play and discourse, parental empathy; and the mirroring support, behavioral synchrony and mutual attunement between caregiver-and-child in the holding-and-facilitating environment of family life.

I would nominate two additional qualities of parents: their mindsets with respect to growth in personality and the alterability of trait dispositions; and parents’ own sense of generativity. These topics are prominent in other “communities of practice,” for example, in the educational and learning sciences (mindsets) and lifespan personality development (generativity). But one claim of this chapter is that the progressive evolution of research on family moral development will require permeable boundaries with other literatures; and that we should be on alert for opportunities to connect the cables among allied notions that reside in other fields of study. Parental mindsets about the malleability of their children’s character (and how this works with parents making character attributions) and their own sense of generativity are two such opportunities.

**Mindsets**

In their now classic paper Dweck and Leggett (1988) introduced a distinction concerning the way individuals understand something very fundamental about human nature: is it fixed by nature (fixed mindset) or does it have the capacity to grow (growth mindset)? They showed that when children have a fixed mindset about their own traits, for example, their intelligence, they tend to avoid academic challenge and to otherwise show a helpless pattern with respect to academic work. In contrast, children who have a growth mindset revel in academic challenge even in the face of setbacks, which they understand as being a necessary part of the learning process. Children with fixed mindsets view intelligence as a stable entity – some people have more, others have less, but there is not much one can do about the amount of intelligence one has. Children with growth mindsets think it possible to grow intelligence, incrementally as it
were, with effort and persistence. Naturally, children with growth and fixed mindsets approach academic work quite differently. Children with fixed mindsets are motivated to look smart, and so avoid challenging tasks that would undermine a favorable image of the public self; children with growth mindsets want to become smart, and so seek out academic challenges to vindicate personal learning goals.

There is now an impressive literature that documents the importance of mindset distinctions across a wide range of domains (Dweck, 2012; Yeager, Johnson, Spitzer, Trzesniewski, Powers, & Dweck, 2014; Yeager & Dweck, 2012). Of particular interest is the implication of fixed-and-growth mindset for understanding personality, particularly the malleability of personal attributes. There is evidence, for example, that the origins and implication of stereotyping can be traced to a tendency to view the personality of others through a fixed mindset (Levy & Dweck, 1999). In one study (Erdley & Dweck, 1993) school-age children saw a slide show about a boy who displayed negative traits (e.g., shy, clumsy, nervous; or lying, stealing, cheating) and were then shown an ending that was consistently negative or one that had a more positive ending. Children who believed that personality is a fixed quality (versus malleable) did not alter their negative ratings of the target boy even when presented with positive counterevidence. Not only were their ratings of the boy more negative, but the entity theorists made more generalized global negative ratings, showed less empathy and recommended harsher punishment than students who endorsed an incremental-growth view of personality.

David Scott Yeager and his colleagues have explored the implications of fixed-and-growth mindset on adolescent social relationships. In one study (Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen & Dweck, 2011) adolescents were more likely to endorse aggressive vengeance against tormentors if they thought the bully had a fixed personality (was a “bad person”) than did adolescents who thought personality was malleable. Adolescents who held an incremental theory about personality found retaliatory aggression less satisfying and were more likely to endorse prosocial solutions to interpersonal problems. In another study, adolescents with a fixed-entity view of personality more often displayed hostile attribution bias (inferring ambiguous provocation as intentional) and harbored more aggressive desires than did adolescents with an incremental mindset concerning personality (Yeager, Miu, Powers & Dweck, 2013).

Research shows that it is possible to shift adolescents’ implicit theory of personality from a fixed-to-incremental mindset, with important implications for social cognition and behavior. For example, in a randomized field experiment, Yeager, Trzesniewski and Dweck (2013) exposed a sample of 9th- and 10th-graders to a six-session intervention that taught an incremental theory that people can change. Compared to a no-treatment control group and a group that received training in coping skills, the mindset treatment group behaved less aggressively and more prosocially one-month after the intervention; and reported fewer conduct problems six months after training. In another study experimentally inducing a shift towards an incremental-malleable view of personality reduced hostile attribution bias and aggressive intent (Yeager, Miu, Powers & Dweck, 2013).

The mindset research program should have important implications for moral education in families and schools (Lapsley & Yeager, 2013). I am aware of no research that explicitly addresses whether parents socialize their children in different ways depending on the implicit theories they hold (of themselves or of their children) concerning the malleability of personal traits. Presumably how parents understand the malleability of moral dispositions should influence the way they understand their role as moral educators. Parents who hold a fixed-entity view of personality might infer more negative dispositional qualities in their children but also that these qualities would be hard to change. Parents with growth-incremental views about personality—both their own and their children—would approach their role in a very different way.

That said, there is some suggestive research on how parents might promote adaptive incremental-growth mindsets in children with respect to their own abilities. Across two studies Kamins and Dweck (1999) showed that person feedback, even when positive, can induce a vulnerability to a helpless orientation and a contingent sense of self-worth. In their first study 5-6-year-old children role-played scenarios with dolls and props where a story character worked hard on a task (stacking blocks, cleaning up after snacks, putting away paints, washing hands after finger painting), made an error, and received one of three kinds of criticism from
a teacher: person criticism (“I’m very disappointed in you”), outcome criticism (“That’s not the right way to do it”) or process criticism (“Maybe you can think of another way to do it”). In a test scenario, a child (in a story) made a Lego house but without windows. The teacher noticed but did not offer feedback. Participants were then administered various assessments, for example, the extent to which their performance reflected well on their abilities and traits (e.g., “Did everything that happened in that story make you feel like a good girl/boy or not a good girl/boy”), their mood after the test scenario, their willingness to persist on the task (“Would you like to do the Lego task again or something else?”) and their general beliefs about whether negative traits endure. The second study was modeled after Study 1 but with successful completion of tasks and person (“I’m very proud of you”), outcome (“That’s the right way to do it”) and process (“You must have tried very hard”) praise.

Across two studies children who were given person feedback (criticism or praise) gave lowered ratings of their product, believed themselves to be less good after error, less nice and less smart than children who received process feedback. Moreover, children given person feedback were less likely to persist on the Lego task and more strongly endorsed the idea that bad character can be diagnosed after a single incident and to be stable over time. As the authors put it, “children who received feedback conveying an evaluation of themselves, their traits and abilities were more likely than children who received feedback to display the full complement of helpless reactions (cognitive, affect and behavior) when they later met with setbacks” (Kamins & Dweck, 1999, p. 844).

The differential outcomes associated with person and process feedback has also been demonstrated in other research. Pomerantz and Kempner (2013) showed, for example, that the more mothers used person praise (“You are smart”) as opposed to process praise (“You tried hard”) the more children were subsequently found to hold an entity theory of intelligence and avoid academic challenge. Similarly, parents use of process praise among 1-3-year-old children was associated with incremental mindsets at 7-8 years of age (Gunderson, Gripshover, Romero, Dweck, Goldin-Meadow & Levine, 2013). However, early use of person praise was not associated with later fixed-ability mindsets.

Character Attributions

The implications of mindset research for moral socialization within the family seems clear enough: avoid person feedback within the web-of-interlocution in favor of process feedback. Yet this implication appears to collide with findings from another developmental research tradition on the importance of character attributions in sustaining prosocial behavior. Indeed, the astute reader will recall that I suggested earlier that elaborative discourse that includes moral character attributions will help children build moral notions as part of their emerging autobiographical self-narrative of “who I am” as a person. But isn’t this a recommendation for parents to give person feedback? Wouldn’t the mindset literature just reviewed advise against parents making character attributions? Quite possibly, but let’s first make a case for character attributions.

Miller, Brickman and Bolen (1975) found that directly telling children that they are “neat and tidy” was more effective for influencing their behavior than telling children that they “ought” to be neat and tidy. Jensen and Moore (1977) showed that children told they are “cooperative” increased cooperative behavior and telling them that they are “competitive” increased competitive behavior. Children who are told that they donated candy because they are the kinds of children who like to share, will more likely share in the future than children who are simply told to share because sharing is the expected thing to do (Grusec, Kuczynski, Simutis, & Rushton, 1978).

The common thread in these studies is that when one produces for oneself, or is given, a certain attribution (“I am generous”; “You are neat and tidy”), this attribution serves to alter one’s self-understanding. One is then more likely to act in ways that confirms this self-understanding (Lepper, 1983), or as the saying goes “if you give a name they’ll play the game.” If I am told that I am the sort of person who likes to share, or that I am neat and tidy, or cooperative, I will be likely to behave in ways that conform to these expectations, I will share, be neat and cooperative, probably because these attributions are now part of my self-concept, and we are motivated to behave in self-consistent ways. This is an important claim of the self-model of moral action (Blasi, 1983).
A series of experiments by Grusec and Redler (1980) is illustrative. In one experiment 7- and 8-year old children were given an opportunity to donate or share marbles and pencils, to help an adult fold cards, and to prepare drawings for sick children. On the first two occasions, some children who shared were given a positive character attribution: "Gee you shared. I guess you’re the kind of person who likes to help others whenever you can. Yes, you are a very nice and helpful person". Other children were reinforced ("praised") for donating or helping: "Gee you shared. It was good that you gave some of your marbles to those poor children. Yes, that was a nice and helpful thing to do." Other children were told nothing about their sharing, or helping (control condition). Note that the distinction between the attribution and the reinforcement conditions was whether the person (attribution) or the behavior (reinforcement) was praised. It is the difference between being a "nice person" (attribution) versus doing a "nice thing" (reinforcement). The mindset literature might liken this to person feedback and process feedback.

The results showed that only the attribution condition facilitated prosocial behavior. Hence, more children folded cards, shared pencils and returned drawings in the attribution condition than in the reinforcement condition. Indeed, praising behavior (reinforcement) and saying nothing at all (control) were equally ineffective on these tasks. The authors came to two conclusions. First, since children who were given character attributions were likely to engage in subsequent prosocial behavior, it is likely that their self-concept, their understanding of themselves as the sort of kids who do nice and helpful things, affected their actual prosocial activities. Second, the effects of character attributions appear to generalize to new situations. Its effects are more enduring, whereas the effects of praise and reinforcement of behavior are much more delimited and situation-specific. Indeed, the effectiveness of dispositional praise ("character attributions") on altruistic behavior was replicated by Mills and Grusec (1989).

This leads to an interesting conclusion. Simple moral exhortation, that is, telling children what they ought to do, and praising what children actually do, are both relatively ineffective for socializing prosocial dispositions in children (e.g., Grusec, Saas-Kortsaak & Simutis, 1978), since neither approach is likely to influence the child’s self-concept. Moreover, this literature would support a recommendation that when it comes to discipline there is an asymmetry between praising and punishing: when punishing, condemnation should fall upon the behavior but not the child, but moral approbation should fall upon the child but not the behavior. Note that character attributions are involved in both cases (Grusec & Redler, 1980).

It would appear, then, that the character attribution and mindset literatures are at cross-purposes when it comes to parenting recommendations. One urges parents to make character attributions, the other urges avoidance of person praise in favor of process praise. But perhaps the dispute is merely apparent. For example, in the Grusec experiments, the character attributions seem like a combination of process ("you like to help others") and person ("you’re a nice and helpful person") praise, whereas in the reinforcement conditions children received (mere) process praise without character attributions.

A hypothesis suggests itself: process (behavioral reinforcement) praise works better than person (character attribution) praise in isolation, but process praise + character attribution works better than process praise in isolation. Put differently, process praise fortified with character attribution might be superior to process praise alone. If true, then character attributions can act like a “booster shot” to process praise. Note also that it is not just a matter of person and process praise, but whether someone believes that personal characteristics can change or not. This latter consideration was not at stake in the character attribution experiments. So just how much the mindset and character attribution literatures support or conflict is not yet clear and there are many interesting questions to address. Resolving these issues is an urgent and exciting research agenda in time future.

**Generativity**

It is not often noticed that parents who are shaping the development of their children are also undergoing significant developmental change. Indeed, parents and their adolescent children face complementary developmental challenges that may encourage a reciprocal cascade of complications in the adolescent-parent relationship: both face the prospect of changing bodies, coming in and out of sexuality,
worries about attractiveness. Teens look at the future as a receding horizon with lots of time to explore and play; parents look at the future as constricting and closing in on them. One looks at their age as time-since-birth, the other as time yet-to-live. Teens worry about what will become of them; parents are sometimes shocked to realize “What have I become?” And both adolescents and their parents will continue to wrestle with the great identity question: “Who am I?” ---teens perhaps for the first time, parents in moments of reconsideration and regret.

But the parental wrestle with identity at mid-life will be confounded or obscured by the more pressing developmental challenge of generativity. Presumably, how parents meet this developmental challenge should influence the way they go about the moral formation of their children, although there is very little evidence on this. Still, there are suggestive hints. For example, McAdams (2015) argued that highly generative adults show a different behavioral profile than do adults with a lower sense of generativity. One of the things that highly generative adults do is to force the confluence of different contexts that influence children---they are more likely to show up to teacher conferences, assist with homework, get involved in youth sports, participate in civic functions to advance good causes, and so on. To actively bend developmental systems in the service of child development is likely to cash out in ways advantageous to children’s moral development, although there is no evidence of this as yet in the literature.

Generative parents also tend to have young adults who are agreeable, conscientious, and open to experience, possibly because they model political interests and religiosity and use authoritative parenting practices (Peterson, 2006; Peterson, Smirles & Wentworth, 1997). The link between maternal generativity and authoritative parenting was also documented by Pratt and colleagues (Pratt, Danso, Arnold, Norris & Filyer, 2001). In their sample, generative mothers also reported an optimistic view of their adolescent children and they engaged in more autonomy-granting practices than less generative mothers (fathers level of generativity was less consistently related to these outcomes).

In another study, Pratt and colleagues explored how family generativity contributes to the intergenerational transmission of values (Pratt, Norris, Heblethwaite & Arnold, 2008). Adolescents at age 16 and 20 were asked to tell stories of how parents and grandparents taught them important values. The stories were scored for the specificity-generality of story episodes, whether the episodes included direct interaction with a parent or grandparent (versus a “heard about” or exemplar incident), whether the story had themes of caring and kindness, and whether the depiction of the adult’s role in the value teaching story was positive or negative. Parents’ generativity was measured by the Loyola Generativity Scale.

The results showed that stories of value teaching by generative parents often included specific episodes, were highly interactive, and included themes of caring. Similarly, when parents were more generative, the stories of value-teaching by grandparents also included highly specific episodes and direct interaction. The authors concluded that parental generativity shapes the family narrative about how values are transmitted. They write:

Adolescents and emerging adults had meaningful stories to tell about the roles of both parents and grandparents in their recollections of family value socialization. They recalled their roles as distinct in some predictable ways, and there were meaningful variations among the adolescents in how both parent and grandparent teaching roles were depicted in family stories when parents were themselves generative, likely reflective of a more positive and successful intergenerational value transmission process (p. 196).

This research suggests that generative parents create a rich context for the construction and sharing of family narratives that transmit important values; and it underscores three points made along the way in this chapter: 1) individual differences in parents’ sense of generativity will likely influence the context of moral formation, although working out the precise mechanism of transmission will require additional research; 2) autobiographical (and family) narrative is an important way that values are understood and transmitted; and 3) the ability to recall specific episodes of value transmission in families of highly generative parents would seem to vindicate the promise of using features of autobiographical memory—whether it is specific or overgeneral, for example -- as a marker of moral formation.
Conclusion

This chapter began with a reflection on the notion of practice and tradition in the historiography of science to sustain the claim that the history of science can act as an intervention on contemporary scientific practice. I drew three lessons from the history of the communal practice known as “moral development” that could guide evolution of research programs on parenting and moral formation. One is that research on the role of early life in the family as a context for moral development should continue apace (in response to the neglect of early life and the family context in the cognitive-developmental tradition). A second is that a broader array of topics can and should be folded under the heading of “moral development” (in response to the marginalization of the cognitive-developmental research program and its orienting assumptions). A third is that moral development in general, and parenting and moral formation in particular, should be open to integrative possibilities with constructs and theories in other psychological literatures (in response to the cognitive-developmental desire to isolate itself from other topics to avoid slippery slopes to ethical relativism).

In her influential paper, Kathryn Wentzel (2002) asked “are effective teachers like good parents?” The answer, of course, was yes – effective teachers impose structure and control, make demands for maturity, but in a classroom marked by nurturance and democratic communication. In other words, effective teachers are both demanding and responsive, just like authoritative parents. Here, then, is an example of how an important educational psychology research question was motivated and framed by appeal to the parenting style literature in developmental science. As it turns out, effective teaching looks a lot like effective parenting, and one of the salutary features of Wentzel’s (2002) paper was how she drew out the implications of the developmental literature on parenting and applied it to teachers in classrooms.

In this chapter I argued that the lines of influence also run in the opposite direction --- from educational science to moral development--- when we considered the implications of mindset research for moral formation; and the implication of teaching practice for parenting practice. In classrooms teachers can mobilize growth mindset with appropriate goal structures or demotivate students with well-meaning but deleterious feedback that solidifies a helpless, fixed-mindset framework. Working out the implications of mindset interventions in schools for parenting practice in homes is an exciting prospect for the future.

It is worth noting that the mindset interventions that have been implemented in schools as randomized control field experiments have been relatively small-scale, “stealthy” and scalable (Paunesku, Walton, Romero, Smith, Yeager & Dweck, 2015; Yeager & Walton, 2011). With respect to raising academic achievement, for example, or improving academic tenacity or personal resilience, their effects have been powerful and long-lasting. Yeager and Walton (2011) have likened the striking enduring effects of stealthy mindset interventions to small changes in the design of wings that provide lift to airplanes. It should be a goal of parenting to provide similar lift to the moral formation of children; and this could be accomplished in similarly stealthy ways by how we give feedback or coach the elaboration of morally-significant events within the web of interlocution of family life.

In addition to mindset, and related questions regarding character attributions, I also suggested that sociomoral formation is a special case of personality development, and that the CAPS and social cognitive approaches to personality offer powerful resources for integrative research. Indeed, social cognitive themes resonate throughout the chapter, from a consideration of internal working models of attachment, to the progressive elaboration of event representations and autobiographical memory to the dispositional coherence of moral personality. Even the mindset literature was once billed as a “social cognitive approach to motivation and personality” (Dweck & Leggett, 1998). I suggested that the clinical-developmental literature on autobiographical memory, in particular the CaR-FA-X model, offers resources for understanding the imprint of sociomoral experiences in family life on the evolving autobiographical narrative of the self. Finally, I suggested along the way a number of parent characteristics beyond parenting style that might be useful lines of new research, including parents’ ideological and faith commitments, their own mindsets with respect to the malleability of (their own and their children’s) traits and their sense of generativity.

This is how powerful integrative theory is built, by reaching beyond the friendly confines of one’s own field of study to encounter allied
notions just beyond the fence. I have argued here that personality development, social cognitive development in early life, clinical-developmental psychopathology, the educational and learning sciences and lifespan personality development, offer rich prospects for integrative research, and that the future prospect for building strong research programs on parenting and moral development are within our grasp, as the present volume attests.

References


Cervone, D. & Shoda, Y. (Eds.) (1999). The coherence of personality: Social cognitive bases of consistency, variability and organization (pp. 185-241). New York: Guilford


